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Foreword
Chris Hughes, Chief Executive, FEDA
T
he debate about franchising has been an important and instructive
one for further education. It has aroused a great deal of interest in 
the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), the Further
Education Funding Council (FEFC) and other national stakeholders,
not to mention colleges themselves. At times it has threatened to generate more
heat than light as protagonists have variously hailed franchising as the new way
forward for the sector, and as a serious distortion of educational priorities.
Towards the end of 1998 FEDA decided that there was a need to bring together
a balanced account of the arguments. We commissioned contributions from a cross-
section of opinion in the sector; from the FE21 group, which represented most of
the major franchising colleges, and two inner city principals known for having
expressed serious reservations. With the advantage of hindsight we can claim
to have got the balance about right. Taken together, the articles form a convincing
record of the arguments that led to the new framework of regulations.
In a brief concluding chapter Mick Fletcher updates the collection with a
summary of the most recent FEFC circulars, relating the new restrictions to the
themes raised by our contributors. As he says this account is of more than
historical interest. The new Learning and Skills Council, proposed in the White
Paper Learning to succeed, will need to strike a balance between national reg-
ulation and local responsiveness; between the dynamism of the market and the
responsibility which must be attached to public services. The experience of fran-
chising in further education is a case study in walking this difﬁcult tightrope. 
It is one from which all concerned with learning and skills need to learn.2
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1.Franchising – 
a case study
in FE funding
Mick Fletcher
Introduction
Franchising, or outward collaborative provision as it was once known, is a
subject which arouses strong passion. There are those in further education who
see much of the rapid development of franchised provision as little better than
a scam. Equally, there are those who see it as the ﬁrst radical step towards irre-
versible changes in the way we deliver learning. This one aspect of the large and
complex world of further education occupied much of the time of the Education
and Employment Committee. It was a cause of concern to the Public Accounts
Committee (PAC), and the Further Education Funding Council (FEFC) itself
has had great difﬁculty in framing policy capable of handling the technical
complexity and political sensitivity of the issue.
If you start from a simple deﬁnition of franchising it is difﬁcult to see what
all the fuss is about. At its simplest franchising is just one mode of delivery of
further education. It involves a college contracting with a third party to deliver
education away from college premises. The third party, which might be an
employer, a community organisation or a private training provider, operates
under the direction of the college which has full responsibility for the quality of
the programme.
However, if you start by looking at the explosive growth of franchising
during the past few years it is all too easy to see why eyebrows have been raised.
Between 1994–95 and 1996–97 the proportion of FEFC students enrolled 
on franchised courses grew from 5% to 19%. During the same period the 
number of funding units accounted for by franchised programmes rose from 
three million to 17 million. As Jan Dominey points out in Chapter 2, franchised4
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provision accounted for the overwhelming majority of the additional student
numbers enrolled between 1993 and 1998 – perhaps 80% of the total growth.
Misgivings in some quarters may also have been prompted by the fact that this
growth was concentrated in only a small number of colleges. Quoting again
from the evidence provided to the Select Committee, a small group of 20 colleges
provided more than half of the total number of franchised units.
This collection of papers from practitioners attempts to paint a balanced
picture of the franchising debate. There is a need to cut through the suspicion
and the self-justiﬁcation which shroud arguments on franchising and to identify
its impact on the sector to date and its proper role in the future. This is partic-
ularly important given that the debate has recently entered the political arena.
Items taken out of context reﬂect not just on franchising but on the sector itself.
The report will identify any general lessons that can be learned from the fran-
chising issue. It will also look for any more general messages about the way in
which independent institutions behave under market conditions. 
In the ﬁrst paper, Jan Dominey writes on behalf of the FE21 group, a vol-
untary group of those colleges most heavily involved in franchised work. Her
paper outlines the beneﬁts of franchising to the principal stakeholders – the
Government and students – and seeks to refute some of the more common
criticisms. She gives examples of the types of innovative provision which fran-
chising has allowed.
Brian Styles from the City of Bristol College is one of the non-franchising
principals who crossed swords with the FE21 group before the Select Committee.
His paper in Chapter 3 emphasises the distorting effects of franchising on the
sector and its impact on non-franchised provision. He foresees continuing difﬁ-
culty for the FEFC and for colleges as franchised provision is brought under
stricter control.
In Chapter 4 Maggie Gidney writes about community-based franchising.
Most franchising has involved private training providers but a signiﬁcant
minority, about one-quarter of the total, has been delivered by voluntary organ-
isations or local authority services. The aims and impact of this type of provision
differ signiﬁcantly from employer-based work. This focus on community-based
franchising helps to underline the variety of forms franchising has taken which
in turn helps to explain why there is no easy regulatory solution to the difﬁculties
which have been raised. 
Birmingham University School of Education was specially commissioned 
by FEDA to research the impact of the funding methodology used in further
education since incorporation. The team rapidly identiﬁed franchising as a key
element in recent funding practice. In Chapter 5, it offers a perspective from
outside further education.5
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To set the scene, this chapter looks at franchised provision in the light of uni-
versal themes which cut across all of further education. Franchising is too complex
and dynamic to be judged as a whole. However, there are:
  Aspects that are unexceptional and aspects that appear to need reform
  Elements that were originally poorly regulated, but which are 
now under clearer control
  Features of franchising that have changed the way the sector works
  Features that will soon be forgotten.
One of the most worrying aspects of franchising – its unexpected and explosive
growth – may be seen as a product of particular circumstances which are unlikely
to occur again.
Key principles
Funding tariff
Many of those who express concern about franchising argue that its substantial
expansion came about mainly because it was too generously priced in the FE
funding tariff. Colleges were able to claim considerably more from the FEFC
than they paid to third-party providers. While some of the difference was legiti-
mately accounted for by quality control arrangements and start-up costs much
of it was used to subsidise other college activities. Colleges which expanded in
this way were able to reduce their unit costs. Since this was one of the factors
taken into account by the FEFC when determining growth bids, these colleges
were able to pre-empt yet more of the growth funding allocated to the sector. It
is this argument that leads to accusations that franchising caused distortion,
both of the mission of individual institutions and of sector priorities.
The aim here is not to judge college behaviour. Too much has been made of
whether colleges were wrong to respond to the incentives placed before them
(or ‘culpable’ for not responding, as one witness expressed it to the Select Com-
mittee). The concern is simply with whether the tariff, in general, was too high.
There are several sources of evidence which suggest that there have at times
been substantial differences between what the Council pays and the costs colleges
have incurred. This is not to say that franchising has been proﬁtable at all times
and in all circumstances. Unwise and badly planned ventures into franchising
could certainly have cost colleges money rather than generated surplus. Others
may have subsidised provision or at best broken even in the ﬁrst years expanding
at the marginal demand-led element (DLE) rate of £6·50 per unit, because they
correctly anticipated that their franchising activity would later be consolidated
at a much higher level of funding. However, overall one piece of evidence that
the tariff was misaligned is the fact that colleges often found it possible to initiate6
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and expand franchising substantially at a rate signiﬁcantly below that which
they subsequently earned. The point was taken by the Select Committee enquiry
and those principals questioned accepted that after initial investment franchised
work yielded a surplus.
Such surpluses were reinvested to support the education and training of other
students. Not even the strongest opponents of franchising developments sug-
gested that the surpluses were in any way misappropriated; simply that they
enabled some colleges to invest at a time when others could not. However, the
franchising developments may have weakened the traditional expectation of
employers that they should pay fees for part-time further education. This would
then reduce overall income to the sector.
Clearer evidence on the question emerges from a study commissioned by the
FEFC from consultants KPMG. This compared the costs of funding qualiﬁ-
cation aims by direct provision and franchising. Both the complexity of the issue
and the weakness of college costing systems made the task difﬁcult, but the
report conﬁrmed what many suspected and conceded in private, namely that
provision from employers and that delivered by private training providers (the
great bulk of franchise arrangements) is systematically cheaper than the equiv-
alent provision delivered directly in colleges. In the light of this, the FEFC
needed to act. The principle behind the current methodology and the workings
of the tariff advisory committee is that funding should be related to the average
cost of provision. Since this paper was written the FEFC has taken ﬁrm action
to limit and control funding. See summary in Chapter 7. The whole logic of unit
calculations and cost weighting factors is predicated on the need to reﬂect costs;
the objective is that the funding regime should not unintentionally favour one
type, subject or mode of provision over another.
This logic is much misunderstood in the sector and not only in the context
of franchising. Many argue simplistically that to reﬂect costs in the tariff rep-
resents a return to the bad old days, when institutions were funded on the basis
of the costs they incurred not the output they produced. The tariff does not
reﬂect whatever costs a college chooses to incur; it reﬂects the average cost at a
given time of producing speciﬁed outputs. If the production function changes
as happens periodically the tariff is revised appropriately.
A further version of this argument is that it is unfair to colleges to adjust the
tariff downwards if they ﬁnd more efﬁcient ways of operating. It is claimed that
this reduces the incentive to innovate. This misses the essence of the tariff
mechanism. It is always to the advantage of individual colleges to ﬁnd more
efﬁcient ways of operating than the average. In this way they will gain a
temporary advantage until the innovation becomes the norm as other colleges
follow suit. When this happens it is right for the funding to reduce and the system7
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at large to gain a permanent beneﬁt. It is right for two reasons. In principle it is
difﬁcult to justify a greater expenditure from public funds than is required to
achieve a stated objective. More pragmatically, to allow funding to stay at the
higher level distorts the incentives given to institutions and thereby their actions.
There is a strong case that in part this is what happened with franchising.
Employer contributions
There is a second issue of principle tangled up in the franchising debate. This
concerns the balance of contributions between individuals, employers and the
State in respect of vocational education and training. It is a much larger issue
than franchising and has been around much longer. However, the new franchise
arrangements bring it out in different ways. As with the tariff question it sub-
divides into issues of principle and issues of pragmatics. The principle concerns
what is the proper role of State funding; the pragmatic aspect concerns what
has come to be called ‘dead weight’, a worry that increased public investment
in an area might cause individuals or employers to decide that they do not need
to make a contribution anymore.
In the public debate much has been made of the possibility of substitution or
‘dead weight’. The Select Committee probed extensively into the arrangements
between major franchising colleges and large national organisations. The key
question is to identify what additional beneﬁt is purchased through the use of
the FEFC money or what might have happened in its absence. The additional
beneﬁt, argued the franchising colleges, was the fact that individuals were ass-
essed to national vocational qualiﬁcation (NVQ) standards and achieved a nat-
ionally recognised qualiﬁcation rather than an internal company certiﬁcate.
The Government agenda, as set out in the Green Paper The learning age, en-
visages individuals and employers taking increased responsibility for funding
education and training. It is this strategy, as well as speciﬁc concerns raised by
franchising examples, which underlay the Secretary of State’s request that the
FEFC increased the fees paid by employers for dedicated provision. Where
dedicated provision is delivered either by direct or collaborative provision, the
Council now assumes the employer will pay a tuition fee of 50% rather than the
25% applied in previous years. This reduces by one-third the tariff units which
may be claimed by such provision.
There is a logic to extending this arrangement to all off-site employer-based
provision and speciﬁcally that involving private training providers. The majority
of franchise work is with private training providers most of whom are providing
courses for employers.
A major complication which franchising has highlighted is the difﬁculty of
assessing the extent of an employer’s contribution in kind. Employers have to8
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meet the premises and equipment costs of provision on their site since Council
funding for the hire of such services should only be made in ‘exceptional’ cases.
Employers also contribute staff and management time to an extent that is difﬁ-
cult to identify or enumerate. The very variability of this contribution and the
difﬁculty of separating out ‘dead weight’ is at the root of much of the complexity
surrounding franchising. It is reﬂected in the variety of rates which different
colleges pay to their franchisees which in turn makes it difﬁcult to set a standard
tariff without risking seriously underfunding some provision and providing
excessively in other cases.
Local priorities
A third major area of principle which is brought into particularly sharp focus
by franchising is the local priorities policy. The FEFC has reﬂected changed
political priorities by giving greater emphasis to regional and local planning.
This is consistent with wider Government moves towards regionalisation, a closer
working relationship with local authorities, particularly in respect of 16–19
provision, and the changing focus signalled by moves from the competitiveness
fund to the collaboration fund. The very high priority given by the Government
to widening participation and combating social exclusion requires a locality-
by-locality focus on provision.
Many of the more dramatic examples of franchising are in tension with this
policy. Around one-third of franchise work takes place outside the region in
which its college is located. From the new Government perspective this raises
two concerns:
  Is a college which is making provision outside its region doing 
so at the expense of its local community?
  Is the provision being made by a distant college compatible 
with local priorities and plans?
This debate in part mirrors a long-running tension in further education. Many
colleges have combined a role serving their local community with a national or
at least regional specialism and questions such as those above could have been
asked about a number of institutions and areas of provision during the last 30
years (and often were). One difference is the speed and scale of franchise devel-
opments. In respect of colleges which are major franchisers, this now represents
a substantial proportion of their work. From the viewpoint of local communities
there has equally been a huge increase in the number of publicly-funded FE
providers operating in an area. Unlike the previous pattern of regional spe-
cialism which grew slowly following open debate through regional advisory
councils and other networks, much franchising work has been undeclared. Its
mediation through third parties has served to obscure involvement so that it9
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has, for example, no longer been possible to say how many colleges are offering
provision in any given area. A minimum reform, and one that is badly needed,
is to identify which colleges are offering what provision where.
It is important to note that the dramatic growth in franchising occurred just
before a signiﬁcant change in the dominant political paradigm in the UK. The
growth was initiated and pursued with vigour in a climate where the emphasis
was on entrepreneurialism, institutional freedom and an encouragement to
grow without too much concern about the nature of that growth. Its subsequent
investigation by the Select Committee and PAC has taken place in a political
climate which is re-emphasising planning and has at least as much concern with
the nature of what is provided as its quantity. The distinction made by this
Government between widening participation and growth encapsulates some of
the changed thinking. The move to integrate franchise arrangements with local
planning and the local priorities policy derives speciﬁcally from this changed
political emphasis.
Conclusions
The particular circumstances which gave rise to the rapid growth of franchising
are over and unlikely to recur in exactly the same form. Franchising is likely to
continue but at a lower level and it will be better integrated into the planning
and quality control mechanisms of the sector. There appear to be three general
lessons which can be learned from this experience.
The most rapid growth in franchising occurred at the time when the market-
driven approach to managing the FE sector was at its peak. Although colleges
were under considerable pressure both to reduce costs and to grow, the mid-
1990s was perhaps the time when the sector was subject to the least central
direction in terms of what it was required to produce or how it was expected to
go about this. These circumstances produced a high degree of dynamism but
also a degree of unpredictability which was expressed most dramatically within
franchising. A move towards greater central control will reduce the number of
surprises but will also reduce the capacity of the system to innovate.
A second general message concerns the speed with which the regulatory body
needs to act in a highly dynamic environment. In this instance the FEFC seemed
slow to recognise the scale of changes and slow to organise a response. In so far
as the rapid growth of franchising represented a response to unintended gen-
erosity in the tariff, it required a rapid response from the Council. However, the
pressure from colleges has constrained the Council, causing its reaction to be
slow. Colleges have sought to ensure that the FEFC cannot act without prior
consultation, has to model carefully the possible impact of changes and, as the
fundamental review group argues, should give 12 months’ notice of changes10
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where possible. This more considered approach to change may be appropriate
in the current more tightly managed circumstances. However, if the sector returns
to the more entrepreneurial market-driven model, these represent unacceptable
constraints on the regulator.
The ﬁnal lesson to be learned from the franchising experience is that it shows
the strength yet at the same time the limitations of ﬁnancial incentives as a driver
for change. In a limited number of institutions the ﬁnancial incentives to develop
franchising produced a powerful response sufﬁcient to affect the character of
the entire sector. This illustrates the potential of ﬁnancial incentives to stimulate
a strong response. Yet at the same time the majority of institutions in the sector
either did not get involved or only did so to a limited extent. Financial incentives
alone, although important, are in themselves not a sufﬁcient condition for
effective change.11
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2.The case 
for collaborative 
provision
Jan Dominey
B
y now, franchising ought to have a fairly respectable pedigree. Also
known as outward/off-site collaborative provision (OCP/CP), it has
been strictly controlled since 1996, and a number of different bodies
have reviewed the provision and agreed that it is sound, either in prin-
ciple or in practice, or both. For example:
  In summer 1997 a Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) working group concluded that franchising should not 
be banned or subject to rigid controls.
  The FEFC Inspectorate reported in 1998 that there are ‘no inherent
weaknesses’ in this type of provision (FEFC, 1998).
  The Kennedy report Learning works (FEFC, 1997a) stated that 
‘we are clear that the use of public funds for franchising … opens 
up new opportunities for learning and learners’. Despite initial 
scepticism, Baroness Kennedy told the Education and 
Employment Committee that:
Franchising is enormously beneﬁcial for … widening participation. 
[There are] a lot of projects out in the communities which will 
be provided by further education in outreach or by franchising. 
I think that this is a very fruitful way of going forward on a 
widening participation campaign.
Report of the Select Committee on Education and Employment.12
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  The Association of Colleges (AoC) told the Select Committee that 
‘many of the innovative franchising schemes have proven very, 
very beneﬁcial to our core business’. (Report of the Select 
Committee on Education and Employment.)
  The Select Committee’s report on further education concluded in 1998:
‘High-quality franchising can play a valuable role in the FE system’. 
Despite this support, even the concept of franchising appears to 
remain controversial. This chapter intends to show that:
    When principals and corporations balance the requirements of the 
two main stakeholders (the students as the main beneﬁciaries and the
Government which determines the policies and meets the costs) then
good quality, value-added franchise partnerships provide a perfect 
win–win solution
    Many concerns about franchising are difﬁcult to justify when you focus
on FE provision from the standpoint of the two main stakeholders
    Franchising is exactly the type of bottom-up, demand-led initiative 
which the Government and the FEFC should be encouraging if they 
are serious about attracting the targeted extra 700000 students 
into further education by 2002.
Perfect win–win solution
Around 20% of the students in further education (approximately 750000 learn-
ers) are now enrolled through franchised programmes. Franchised provision
accounts for the majority (perhaps 80%) of the additional student numbers
enrolled between 1993 and 1998.
OCP is provision where the FE college contracts the delivery of training to
an external provider (such as a training provider or a voluntary group), to take
place away from college premises (for example, in the workplace or in a com-
munity centre). In such a case, the college retains full responsibility for the
student and quality of the programme, and must meet rigorous guidelines set
out by the FEFC in 1996 (FEFC circulars 96/06 and 96/32) and augmented on
numerous occasions since then. The latest position is set out in Circular 99/37,
which summarises all regulations to date. These guidelines are far more dem-
anding than those applied to traditional provision. Programmes are subject to
both annual audit and periodic inspection by the FEFC. The college will usually
make a payment to the external provider, often based on a set amount per FEFC-
funded unit achieved through the contract.
Franchised programmes are not substantially different from the traditional
core business of FE colleges. As with the core business, they cover:13
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  Non-advanced post-16 education and training
  Vocational, general and key skills programmes which are 
accredited and quality assured
  Provision which often offers open access
  Flexibility, offering choice over the time, place and mode of delivery
  A partnership approach
  Local, regional and occasionally national markets.
The differences are sometimes elusive. For example, does a programme delivered
by a lecturer from the agency Education Lecturing Services (ELS) in an employer-
based learning centre constitute OCP, given that it is clearly off site and based
on collaboration, or is it (as one college saw it) simply an extension of their well-
established outreach programme?
FEFC statistics based on the 1995/96 individualised student record (ISR)
show that the greatest proportion of collaboration (54% nationally) has been
through training providers, who in turn have extensive networks with small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Many programmes have also been established
with voluntary organisations (18%), employers (13%) and public sector/local
authority organisations (13%), with ‘other’ accounting for 2%. Colleges that
have been working with collaborative partnerships for several years have now
developed highly-differentiated strategies to make best use of the partnership
approach. For example:
  Nationally, 800 learners each year achieve NVQs at Levels 2, 3 and 4 through
Swindon College’s collaboration with the Nationwide Building Society
  South East Essex College has used FEFC funding in partnerships 
with local training providers to widen access to training, particularly 
for unemployed adults
  Barnsley College and the Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO)
have jointly developed national standards for security guard training,
through which 17000 security guards gained qualiﬁcations in 1998
  Handsworth College has used the community links of its ethnic minority
staff to develop a network of community partnerships – often through
churches and mosques, both in Birmingham and in other towns and 
cities – which has enrolled almost 30000 students.
Critics have argued that initially this provision was opportunistic. However,
even they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deny that increasingly partnerships have matured
in a genuine spirit of collaboration, resulting in improved systems, investment
in infrastructure and the development of coherent progression routes.14
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Beneﬁts of franchising to students
In his recent article on the University for Industry (UfI), David Robertson lists
‘factors which impede … the propensity to learn’ (1998). These include:
  Shift work and interrupted career patterns
  Competing work and domestic commitments
  Unwelcome and inappropriate course content and pedagogic experience
  Health and travel difﬁculties
  Funding constraints
  Lack of peer support.
Similar factors were identiﬁed by the authors of a recent FEDA report (Martinez,
1998) on student retention. They observed that:
Students continually weigh the costs and beneﬁts of completion and this
process starts even before they enrol … If the scales tip too far towards 
the costs, they will withdraw Quoted in The TES, 1998
Because many potential students perceive the costs as far outweighing the bene-
ﬁts they do not even get as far as enrolment. This is particularly true of older
people in social classes 4 and 5, working in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs or in
SMEs. These people are also likely to receive, on average, not more than one-third
of the training at work which is available to their better-educated, middle-class
peers in larger companies or non-manual occupations (see Robertson, 1998).
MORI’s Attitudes to learning 98survey (Campaign for Learning, 1998) states:
Most of the learning that people actually undertake is related to 
their current or possible future jobs, rather than their personal 
interests. This may be due to the fact that employers and work 
colleagues are the strongest inﬂuences on people’s decisions to 
start learning. It may also reﬂect the tremendous importance 
of learning at work for most people.
The survey asked individuals to list the key inﬂuences in their learning. It found
that the top inﬂuence to prompt someone to start learning was the employer
(34%), followed by friends (25%). MORI also found that the majority of adults
(56%) agreed that training during paid work hours is most likely to improve
performance at work, followed by ‘your own trial and error’ (48%) and ‘informal
advice/tips on how to do your job from your line manager/workmates’ (46%).
A total of 69% of adults agreed that they would ﬁnd time to use a workplace
learning centre or resources room ‘if it would help me to do my job better’. Adults
feel they learn most in the home (57%), at work (43%) or in libraries (36%).15
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The most interesting thing about this research for those working in the FE sector
is that colleges simply do not ﬁgure in this overview of adults’ learning prefer-
ences, either as an inﬂuence to start learning, or as a preferred provider of learning
opportunities. However good the service the sector is providing to those already
converted to education, if colleges are not acting in partnership with employers,
community groups and training providers, they will not appear in the learning
picture for the vast majority of the population who are non-converts.
Table 1 summarises the key differences between OCP students and those
enrolled through direct provision, as identiﬁed in FEFC statistics (Franchising:
background information, July 1997, unpublished paper presented to the funda-
mental review group seminar). Off-site collaborative provision is more likely to
be taken up by:
  Older low-skilled and/or unqualiﬁed learners
  Part-time students
  Those who have never crossed the threshold of a college and 
who traditionally receive little training in their work.
Table 1. Differences between collaborative and direct provision
Collaborative Direct
Feature (%) (%)
Part-time attendance (students) 94 76
Female students 49 58
Students older than 25 years 77 58
Qualiﬁcations in Health and Community Care 31 9
Non-NVQs at Entry and Level 1 73 30
Non-NVQs at Level 3 11 40
Many OCP students achieve new skills and qualiﬁcations for the ﬁrst time since
leaving school. The following are a few typical students who have enrolled through
collaborative provision in colleges which are part of the voluntary FE21 group,
set up by a number of colleges to develop understanding of franchising:
  Gerald is a mechanic who can’t afford time away from his small 
specialist business: he takes his tuition online through distance learning
with Newham College, with the support of a telephone helpline. Having
‘caught the learning bug second time round’ he is now encouraging his
employees to do the same.16
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  Dave enrolled on basic skills tuition via a Pathways project planned 
in collaboration between West Cheshire College and his employer,
Vauxhall; he has now completed numeracy qualiﬁcations to Level 3 
and a supervisory qualiﬁcation. As a result he has been promoted 
to ﬁrst-line management.
  Pam is retired but is studying Computer Literacy and Information
Technology (CLAIT) with another college, at the learning centre of 
her former employer. This is her ﬁrst accredited course since leaving 
school and she is doing it purely for her personal satisfaction.
  Sarah is a care assistant in a nursing home and the mother of two young
children. Her ﬁrst experience of education since leaving school was the 
ﬁrst aid certiﬁcate she took through a short course organised through a
collaborative partnership between a college and a local training provider
with specialist links in the care sector. She has since taken a Basic Food
Hygiene certiﬁcate and now has the conﬁdence to start an NVQ Level 2.
Looking again at Robertson’s list of impediments (1998) detailed in Table 2, it
is easy to see why collaborative programmes are so much more successful at
attracting these students.
Students’ motivation to achieve is higher not only because many of the de-
motivators have been eliminated, but also because the provision exhibits the
positive features identiﬁed by MORI (Campaign for Learning, 1998): using the
beneﬁcial inﬂuence of employers, workmates and other peers and providing an
opportunity to use practical learning experiences.
Costs of franchising for the Government
Collaborative partnerships widen participation. They also help the Government
to raise achievement levels and promote lifelong learning. They attract large
numbers of students back to learning for the ﬁrst time, by providing local,
accessible, tailor-made training and education, usually with strong peer group
support. Much of this provision differs very little from more traditional out-
reach programmes, adult education or employer-based training (depending on
the type of partnership): the controversial aspects of the provision are more to
do with its funding and management and whether it is a valid way to spend
public funding.
The scale of the Government’s problem with training is universally acknowl-
edged. Robertson (1998) writes of the:
legacy of massive underqualiﬁcation amongst older workers … a hangover
from the consequences of social exclusion which have characterised structural
arrangements of the UK education system for generations.17
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Table 2. Factors which impede learning
Potential impediment
Shift work and interrupted 
career patterns
Competing work and 
domestic commitments
Unwelcome and inappropriate 
course content and 
pedagogic experience
Health and travel difﬁculties
Funding constraints
Lack of peer support
Collaborative provision feature that
has overcome this barrier
Programmes often allow students 
to enrol on short courses, drop 
in and out of learning and use
resource-based learning that 
ﬁts around working hours
Programmes tend to be community 
or workplace based; individually 
tailored programmes are time-effective,
obviating the need for students to
waste time on travel, unnecessary
‘lessons’ and administration
The learning is often customised 
and integrated with the job or with 
a meaningful community project so
that the purpose and the progression
routes are clear
Transport and access barriers 
often eliminated
Tailor-made programmes are cost-
effective for the student and often
lever employer or other support
Students usually have the reassurance
of training with their workmates or
other peer groups; peer group pressure
operates in a beneﬁcial way
The learning age Green Paper states the problem succinctly:
Our weakness lies in our performance in basic and intermediate skills.
Almost 30% of young people fail to reach NVQ Level 2 by the age of 19.
Seven million adults have no formal qualiﬁcations at all; 21 million adults
have not reached Level 3 (equivalent to two A-levels), and more than one
in ﬁve of all adults have poor literacy and numeracy skills … We lag behind
France, Germany, the USA and Singapore in the proportion of our workforce18
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qualiﬁed to Level 3. In the case of graduates, even though we have a 
high number, we need to encourage more of our highly qualiﬁed people 
to update their skills through continuing professional development.
DfEE, 1998b
As shown above, the 750000 students enrolled through collaborative programmes
are exactly the group the Government has identiﬁed for widening participation
initiatives. This cohort represents the majority of the recent growth in student
numbers in the FE sector, which exceeded the target of 25% within three years
set by the previous Government in 1993. The number of FEFC-funded students
rose from about 940000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in 1992–93 to 1·25 million
by 1996–97.
Growth was stimulated by the introduction of the demand-led element
(DLE) of funding: a mechanism whereby colleges which had met their funding
target could draw down an unlimited amount of extra funding units at the much
lower unit price of £6·50.
The success of this mechanism made a major contribution to the reduction
of unit costs in further education by at least 15% between 1993–94 and 1996–97.
However, it also resulted in the DLE crisis of early 1997, when the Government,
alarmed at the cost of this success, placed a cap on growth. Despite continuing
demand for growth, actual FE enrolments were not allowed to expand substan-
tially again until 1999, the ﬁrst year of growth towards the Government’s new
target of 700000 additional students in further education by 2002.
It is extremely difﬁcult for colleges to hit their targets exactly. If they attempt
to do so they tend to underachieve. The demand-led element rewarded them for
overshooting by allowing them to draw down funding for the additional students
but at marginal cost. When colleges responded to this opportunity by developing
the ﬁrst franchised programmes, the ﬁnancial beneﬁts for the colleges were clear:
  Costs were controllable through the terms of the contract
  Training providers often had lower stafﬁng costs and other overheads
  The programmes made use of provider resources (including specialist
equipment) and so did not require a long-term commitment from the
college in terms of stafﬁng, equipment and accommodation.
This last point is crucial: capital investment is a critical issue for colleges. An FEFC-
sponsored survey at incorporation showed that an investment of £839 million
was required in the ﬁrst ﬁve years to make up for the lack of investment during
the 1980s. Until 1995, the FEFC was able to allocate a proportion of this funding
but for more than three years since then capital allocations have been cut back
and the promised private sector funding has not even begun to ﬁll the gap. Through19
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collaborative partnerships some colleges have been able to make creative arrange-
ments to access alternative accommodation and equipment, which allows them
growth in student numbers without straining scarce resources.
Collaborative provision also makes good ﬁnancial sense for the Government.
It has now been accepted (for example, by the Education and Employment
Committee) that the FE sector is more cost-effective than either training and
enterprise councils (TECs) or schools and the gap is widening. Accountability
in the sector is high with much information publicly available and few instances
of misuse of funding. Inspection evidence also shows that colleges overwhelm-
ingly deliver high-quality learning – better than schools – although TEC provision
is only just beginning to be subject to inspection. When collaborative provision
was inspected separately in further education, in 57% of lessons observed the
strengths clearly outweighed weaknesses. The FE sector as a whole provides
excellent value for money.
Within FE provision, collaborative programmes represent particularly good
value for public money. This can be illustrated by taking the example of a student
studying for a qualiﬁcation equivalent to an NVQ at Level 3. Cost to the public
purse can vary widely:
  For a TEC-funded modern apprentice, payments to the employer alone
could amount to £4860 during three years (DfEE, 1998c, p96).
  A student enrolled on to a full-time mainstream programme in a college
would be funded at a minimum of £1620 at the level of funding per unit
chosen for convergence (£16·20).
  Funding for a similar student on a collaborative programme is limited to
42 funding units (maximum funding of £680·40); under the DLE mechanism,
some colleges were providing certain programmes at £6·50 per unit
(maximum funding of £273 for the same outcome).
In practice, the funding could be even lower, since it is based on a calculation
of guided learning hours: this applies particularly to experienced employed
people who need relatively few hours of guided learning.
The provision is cost-effective because it is generally taking a contribution
from the partner organisation and also from the student – in terms of time, accom-
modation and access to equipment – rather than depending solely on the college’s
resources. In making these resources available at no cost to the public purse, it
offers all the beneﬁts envisaged by the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), yet through
a different route. 
In terms of meeting targets for qualifying the UK workforce to national
standards, the collaborative partnership route has to be an extremely attractive
option. It is also close to the Government’s vision for the UfI.20
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Concerns about franchising
Payments to employers
One controversial area surrounding franchising is the question of who should
pay for the training. Payments to employers for their in-house training have 
been banned by the FEFC, despite the report from the Joint Working Group on
Franchising, which has stated that there is a case in principle for public funding
for employer-based training. The Joint Working Group’s view was no surprise:
such use of public funding has traditionally been regarded as perfectly normal
and acceptable, most notably on day-release provision – and not just for the
16–19 age group. For example, 30 years ago one FE21 group principal taught
classes for bus inspectors, who were mainly middle-aged, which took place
either on the employer’s premises or on residential programmes:
The students never crossed the threshold of the college; much of the
learning took place on the job and was delivered by the employer’s own
staff. The circumstances were almost indistinguishable from a present-day
franchised programme; the employer even received back far more from the
training levy than they put in, because of the volume of training delivered.
No-one ever suggested that the students should have been excluded
because they did not travel to college premises to attend classes. 
DfEE, 1998c, Appendix 25, p250 ff
There is still confusion over which employer-provided training should or should
not be funded. For example, the Government appears to ﬁnd it acceptable to
make payments to employers for taking on modern apprentices. The arrange-
ments for the New Deal – Welfare to Work – will provide £750 to employers to
pay for the day-release element of the trainees’ programme. It is difﬁcult to see
why this type of funding is different from that made available to employers to
assist in the training to nationally accredited standards of, usually, unqualiﬁed
and low skilled staff through collaborative partnerships.
Added value
All FEFC-funded programmes must provide added value in return for the invest-
ment of public funding: it is not appropriate for FEFC funding simply to replace
other funding for provision which would have happened anyway. Again, this 
is an issue mainly with employers who may have been funding training for a
group of employees out of their own training budget – a practice which both the
Government and the FE sector want to encourage.
However, even if a group of trainees has previously received training through
the employer’s budget, this does not rule out the development through a collab-
orative partnership of a different programme of training so long as that offers21
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added value. For example, there is a difference between an uncertiﬁcated in-house
induction carried out through the employer’s budget and a quality-assured NVQ
which can help employees to progress in their career and which contributes to
the achievement of national targets for education and training (NTETs). The
beneﬁt of this qualiﬁcation for an employee in, for example, the security or care
sectors – both of which employ many unqualiﬁed people on the margins of
social exclusion – should not be underestimated.
The interests of employers cannot always be relied on to coincide with those
of their employees, or to match the goals of national policy makers. To take just
one example, employers know they need training for their employees but are
unlikely to put much effort into helping them to achieve qualiﬁcations; they may
see qualiﬁcations as a distinct disadvantage, since they encourage job mobility.
Even those who have Investors in People (IiP) status often prefer to set their own
standards rather than expend energy on meeting those set by external bodies,
which are counted towards NTETs. In such a case, the college adds value in the
partnership by providing assessment and access to transferable qualiﬁcations
for workers who are often unqualiﬁed. Similarly, it is unreasonable to assume
that employers will fund training to meet the generic skills deﬁcit among older
workers, but colleges can add value by providing key and basic skills training
which complements specialist in-house training.
Local planning
Another argument against franchising is that it complicates or undermines local
planning. The truth is that much franchised provision is carefully planned, but
at sector-wide or national rather than local level, as shown by the examples
given earlier – Nationwide Building Society, for example contracting within one
college for a national programme. However helpful local planning may be, it is
difﬁcult to see why one type of provision (local) should automatically take prece-
dence over another (such as regional or national collaborative programmes) which
is of proven success. If the sector is serious about being customer-centred, then
it is right to be ﬂexible and to offer partners and students choice over the type
of provision.
Not all provision can be planned effectively at a local level. To take the partner-
ship between Barnsley College and SITO as an example. There are it seems only
two colleges in the country offering qualiﬁcations for security guards, of which
Barnsley College is by far the bigger provider. So this provision is not in direct
competition with other local provision. It would simply not be viable to offer the
qualiﬁcation on a local basis through colleges up and down the country. In any
case, the strength of the partnership comes through the access the SITO has to
SME networks and its ability to plan tailor-made accreditation to national stan-
dards. This provision is only imaginable through national planning. It parallels22
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the development of specialist centres, a strategy already accepted in the National
Health Service (NHS) but relatively limited in further education. As one MP said
after seeing an FE21 group presentation earlier this year:
This makes perfect sense to me. We don’t expect every hospital to have
specialist units for every kind of cancer. It is more cost-effective to have
regional and national centres so why shouldn’t the same thing apply 
in further education?
Promoting the concept of local provision, against the needs of partners and stu-
dents, would be the very opposite of a demand-led approach. Certainly local col-
leges cannot assume an automatic right to enrol local students where the latter
can be better served elsewhere. Colleges that have focused on traditional local
provision may feel they have been penalised when they look at the success of the
nearby college that has developed collaborative partnerships. Yet national policy
never has been primarily about being fair to college managers and staff.
Nor do partner organisations and students take kindly to being passed around
like parcels and referred back to their local colleges – life would be so much
easier for the FE manager if they did. They have strong views on their partner
colleges. For example:
We (hotel group) have a long-term training plan and therefore prefer 
to work long term with a provider that can supply nationally a full range 
of courses on site. This year there are 140 students over 22 sites.
Employer, quoted in Portwood et al., 1998
Our community care scheme operates on 50 sites around the country. 
We needed the college local to our head ofﬁce to deliver NVQs nationally.
Community organisation, quoted in Portwood et al., 1998
The Government’s laudable desire to have planning coherence at a local level
need not conﬂict with its intention to create successful non-traditional delivery,
such as the UfI, so long as careful consideration is also given to the needs of partners
and students, to national and specialist provision and to distance learning.
Traditional provision is better
Some franchising opponents promote the idea that traditional provision is some-
how better. For example, they:
  Criticise collaborative programmes for not 
‘giving students a college experience’
  Raise alarm that policy may encourage traditional provision 
to be substituted by franchised provision23
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  Point out that more rigorous quality assurance mechanisms are 
required for provision at a distance
  Suggest that collaborative programmes may demand a disproportionate
allocation of resource to administration, audit and other non-productive
work (because it is more difﬁcult to control).
This is a case where the proof of the pudding is in the eating. New learners are
being attracted to collaborative programmes. If the quality of the programme is
good, value is being added by the investment of public funding and the provision
is cost-effective. The learners are staying the course and achieving at the end.
Distortion of funding mechanism
Brian Styles, Principal of City of Bristol College, has made some interesting argu-
ments about the surpluses generated within FE colleges when collaborative
provision, initially funded through DLE at £6·50 per unit, was transferred to
the colleges’ core units and funded at the average level of funding (ALF) (currently
£16·20) (DfEE, 1998c; Styles, 1997a). Given that the colleges, if they were at
all responsible, would have costed the programmes originally at £6·50, this left
any college running a signiﬁcant proportion of collaborative provision with a
surplus which it could contribute to overheads or use to cross-subsidise other
provision. The situation was exacerbated when the FEFC early in 1997 had to
discontinue any form of DLE – even within a capped pot – transferring all pro-
vision into core funding at a stroke. This is neither a problem with the funding
methodology nor an argument against franchising per se, as Styles himself made
clear. It creates an issue relating to fairness to FE colleges, which necessarily
should come far lower down in the order of priorities than the interests of
students or the Government.
These issues were thoroughly explored by the education sub-committee. One
member asked: ‘Are you not being negligent … by not franchising? Could you
not access a lot more learners if you did franchise?’ One principal replied that
he had ruled out franchised provision in his college out of concerns for quality
and the risk that ‘we would overstretch ourselves in relation to our existing
clientele’. He added:
In hindsight now, I could kick myself … The problem now is that 
there is no breakout because we are capped as well, so we are trapped
underneath it … At that time I did not realise I was going to be a loser. 
In that sense I am culpable of negligence now. DfEE, 1998c, p99 ff
This raises issues for the FEFC and the funding methodology. These are currently
being addressed (see Chapter 7), with the FEFC considering a differential rate24
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for collaborative programmes. However, there are risks attached to taking this
approach too far as set out below.
Currently, the FEFC allocates funding to colleges by unit of activity and cost-
weighting factors. Taking broad curriculum areas as a whole and total college
activity overall, most college managers seem to agree that it produces a reason-
able result. However, the total income stream has to pay for support services,
product development, infrastructure and staff development, as well as the more
obvious teaching and quality assurance costs. The principal and corporation
have a duty to secure the best value for money within their allocation of funds.
Inevitably, this means that there will be a great deal of healthy internal cross
subsidy; it is not possible to cost programmes exactly, nor would it be desirable
to do so. If the FEFC were to attempt to pay for programmes at cost there would
be no incentive to college managers to keep those costs down. They would instead
be rewarded with extra money for keeping costs as high as possible (a well-known
phenomenon in the public sector).
Another danger in trying to cost collaborative programmes too exactly is that
they may become marginalised as a low-cost activity, when the right way forward
would be to make a massive investment in infrastructure, student support and
curriculum development to develop a positive and forward-looking partnership
strategy for the 21st century.
At present, collaborative programmes are among the most cost-effective
programmes in many colleges (although at least one FE21 group principal who
has done some calculations is sure that in his college the most cost-effective
programmes are conventional evening classes with large groups). The FEFC should
consider moving to a clearer position on what it is paying for. This should be not
just the sum of its parts, course by course, student by student, but the synergistic
larger vision. Via funding such provision it is also effectively purchasing the whole
college strategic plan. This should include the positive role the college plays as
an active partner in developing the local, regional and national economy.
Conclusion – value of demand-led initiatives
Franchised programmes expanded rapidly in the FE sector when colleges were
set two challenging targets: to achieve 25% growth within three years, accom-
panied by year-on-year efﬁciency gains. The scale of the problem was all the greater
as there is traditionally a lack of demand for further education. The student
population in colleges was relatively static and the growth achieved in the sector
through traditional provision during the four-year period from 1993–97 was
relatively small. It would have been surprising if colleges had been able to pro-
duce dramatic growth in student numbers by continuing to do more of the same.
A radically different approach was needed to achieve this growth.25
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Franchised partnerships provided colleges with the solution. Typically, training
providers in effect acted as a marketing arm for the college and were often able
to deliver the training at a lower cost. For the ﬁrst time colleges were able to tap
into areas of unmet demand, reaching new groups, particularly SMEs, through
these intermediaries. The success was such that after the FEFC had capped
growth in the sector, the Association of Colleges (AoC) estimated that an addi-
tional 300000 students at least could have been enrolled in 1997–98 if the
funding had been available.
The FE sector is now once again embarking on a period of growth, with a
challenging target of 700000 additional students. The potential for this target
to be met through collaborative partnerships is clear; the potential for it to be
met through other routes – whether new or traditional – is uncertain. The great
advantage to colleges now is that additional funding appears also to be coming
through. The disadvantage is that in the present political climate the emphasis
on planning, particularly at a local level, may disempower colleges, to the extent
that they will be prevented from using the partnership approach to widen
participation and achieve the Government’s aims.
As noted above, some of the most successful franchised programmes have
been those planned at national, sector or company-wide level rather than at the
local level. Although in principle such partnerships can continue to be funded
provided they meet FEFC’s criteria, the latter’s proposals for 1999–2000 suggest
a clear disincentive – a weighting of 0·67 for provision through non-local partner-
ships. Colleges wishing to use franchising to widen participation have two
choices. One is to ﬁnd new ways of partnership working which will take account
of the new planning structures and priorities. The other is to work with the lower
rate of funding for non-local provision, with the attendant risk of further cuts
or restrictions if Government policy continues to reinforce the local dimension.
The franchising approach is often a genuine improvement on previous practices
in the FE sector, because it is genuinely based on designing provision around
demand, bottom-up. It offers lessons for the whole sector, and for the policy
makers. Robertson observes that:
The terrain is littered with the burned-out remnants of doomed supply-
side initiatives … The problem with failed supply-side initiatives is not that
they failed … The problem lies in the fact that too little seems to have been
learned from the failures, and too much reliance continues to be placed 
on supply-side initiatives rather than demand-led strategies. 1998
Conversely, it would be a great shame if the lessons were not learned from this
successful demand-led strategy. As the MORI report shows (Campaign for
Learning, 1998), it is wrong to assume that there is no demand for learning:26
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people are positive about learning and enjoy it. A massive 90% agreed that
learning is ‘fairly important’ or ‘very important’ to them personally and 93%
of adults said they enjoyed it. What they are less positive about is having to make
a journey to an FE college to access learning in a package which, for whatever
reason, is not congenial to them. Like the principal quoted above who was
concerned that franchising might distract him from meeting the needs of his
existing clientele, both FE managers and policy makers will have to look beyond
those who are already their clients in the sector. The way to promote genuine
lifelong learning will be to meet the needs of that majority of potential learners
whom they have not yet enrolled.27
For better or worse
3.The rise and fall 
of franchising
Brian Styles
A
review of signiﬁcant developments affecting FE colleges since their
independence from local authority control in 1993 would include a
major section on franchising.
The fact that franchising has grown rapidly during the last four
years has already been noted in earlier chapters. Franchising has also had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the mission and strategy of a number of colleges and attracted
considerable publicity, much of it negative. Despite its obvious importance,
deﬁning activities covered by franchising is difﬁcult. Generally, the macro dis-
tinction is between in-college provision and franchising. The characteristics of
the latter are that it is not delivered from college premises and all, or part, of the
learning programme is delivered by staff employed by another organisation. It is
a form of sub-contracting which covers a continuum from small selected inputs
through to complete responsibility for delivery.
Assessing whether franchising is a good or bad development for further edu-
cation in England is not a concern of this chapter. Instead, the aims are to:
  Understand the reasons for the growth in franchising
  Assess its impact on college behaviour
  Identify the policy issues it raises.
Explaining growth in franchising
A search for the reasons for the exceptional growth in franchising should begin
with an analysis of college mission statements. If this policy pull could be identiﬁed28
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within these statements it would indicate that growth occurred because colleges
wished to move into new curriculum areas and develop new approaches to its
delivery. The available evidence seems to give little support to this explanation.
In particular, the FEFC special report on collaborative provision (1998) con-
cluded that:
Few strategic plans (of colleges) address fully how collaborative work 
ﬁts with the college mission or how it relates to curriculum planning 
within the college.
In the absence of evidence to support the existence of policy pull it is necessary
to identify other possible reasons for its attractiveness. The most obvious of
these is cost of delivery.
The FEFC’s published ﬁgures for 1996–97 indicate that the median transfer
to collaborative partners was £6·50 and the mean was £8·40. The equivalent
mean for in-college provision (excluding franchising) was not available but must
have been at least £17·50. Although these ﬁgures are unreﬁned, any statistician
offered the two FEFC data sets – average payments to third parties for fran-
chising units (mean £8·40) and average costs for in-college provision (mean
£17·50) – would conclude, at any level of signiﬁcance, that they covered two
distinct populations. This may seem a rather technical point from which to begin
an analysis of something as potentially emotive as franchising. However, this
chapter maintains that the average cost of franchised activity was, and remains,
signiﬁcantly lower than in-college provision and that this is the essential starting
point for understanding why franchising has grown and the impact it has had
on the funding methodology and the sector’s strategic development.
This FEFC data identiﬁed franchised provision as being much cheaper to deliver
than in-college provision. There are three main factors which could potentially
explain that difference: lower costs; additionality; and inconsistencies in the
tariff. These will be considered in turn.
Despite the sector’s considerable progress in reducing the cost of delivery,
particularly stafﬁng costs (via longer teaching hours, eliminating higher grades,
introducing instructors, sourcing part-time lecturers from outside), in some cur-
riculum areas colleges still operate at levels above those achieved by private
providers. The extent of these cost differentials has narrowed signiﬁcantly during
the last ﬁve years and they only explain a small element of the difference in the
mean cost between in-college and franchised provision. However, they have
inevitably produced a predisposition for colleges to undertake franchising.
As for additionality, most companies and many of the private providers
would have gone ahead with the training, or something very similar, whether or
not it attracted FEFC funding. This means that partners often seek to maximise29
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the contribution from public funding rather than to ensure that it covers the full
cost of the training. The contribution would be used to improve proﬁtability,
enhance competitive pricing or increase training budgets. For example, those
involved in recreational or introductory diving courses noticed a sharp drop in
tuition costs when they were provided via franchise arrangements with colleges
and then an increase when they were subsequently excluded from FEFC funding.
As would be expected, the robustness of the FEFC’s tariff system has been
severely tested by franchising. Colleges tend to offer a wide range of provision
and experience the effect of swings and roundabouts as far as the tariff is con-
cerned. Franchised activity is specialist in nature and exploits inconsistencies or
weaknesses in the tariff. One-third of the franchised provision is in health and
community care (ﬁrst aid being the largest single area); a large percentage of the
rest is in Computer Literacy and Information Technology (CLAIT) and sports
qualiﬁcations; one-third involves fewer than 20 guided learning hours; the
qualiﬁcations aim predominately at Entry Level or Level 1 (FEFC, Franchising:
background information, July 1997 ). This illustrates that most franchised activity
is focused within relatively few curriculum areas and levels.
As was seen in Chapter 1, in response to the Government’s requirement to
deliver signiﬁcant growth in further education at declining unit costs, the FEFC
constructed an ideal environment to support the rapid development of fran-
chising. Its funding methodology provided the necessary rewards to make fran-
chising attractive.
The FEFC’s operating regime up to 1997–98 supported franchising in a num-
ber of important respects, as outlined below.
Demand-led element
The introduction of the open-ended demand-led element (DLE) allowed colleges
to develop franchising at no risk providing that they managed the collaboration
competently and paid the collaborator less than £6·50 per unit – the amount
they received for additional units from the FEFC.
Low average level of funding
Until 1997–98 the FEFC funding system was based around the concept of core
and funded growth and was driven by a college’s average level of funding (ALF).
This approach produced a double incentive for franchised activity. A college’s
ALF (for growth funding purposes) was calculated by dividing FEFC funding
(core +bid) by the actual units delivered. The impact of that particular approach
is illustrated in Table 3.
If during the year college B contracted for 200000 franchised units, it would
receive additional funding of £1·3 million (200000 ×£6·50 per unit) and its ALF
would fall to £12 per unit (£12 million for one million units). This arose because30
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Table 3. Calculation of ALF
College A B
FEFC core funding (£1000s) 12000 12000
Core units (1000s) 800 800
ALF 15 15
Franchised units — 200
Total units 800 1 000
‘Actual’ or ‘allocation’ ALF 15 12
when calculating the ALF the methodology took no account of the DLE funding
received but it did count the units. In the subsequent funding year college B received
a considerably larger additional bid allocation than college A because of its lower
ALF. It was able to sell to the FEFC low-cost franchised units at the bid price
which was, on average, nearly £10 per unit above the DLE price. The impact of this
process on an individual college was illustrated by David Eade, Chief Executive
of Barnsley College, at a Network Training seminar on franchising. He reported
that his college had been able to cross-subsidise its in-college provision by more
than £2 per unit as a result of the surpluses earned on its franchising activities.
The effect described above arose because the FEFC allocation model prior to
1997–98 was based on what could be called an ‘allocation’ ALF. This was calcu-
lated by including in the divisor the units generated in the previous year but only
including in the numerator the core funding allocation. This meant that any
income received from the DLE funding was excluded. This ‘allocation’ ALF was
always lower than the funded ALF wherever a college had generated DLE in-
come. Since most of the DLE was derived from franchising, colleges with high
levels of franchising were likely to have low ‘allocation’ ALFs and thereby bene-
ﬁted from being placed at the head of the queue for additional funded units in
the subsequent allocation round.
Building projects
The percentage that the FEFC contributed to a college’s agreed building pro-
gramme varied directly with its ALF (calculated as illustrated above). This resulted
in the FEFC’s percentage contribution being signiﬁcantly higher to colleges with
low ALFs.
Performance indicators
There are six college performance indicators published by the FEFC. Most of
these were likely to be inﬂuenced favourably by a high level of franchising. The
indicators are:31
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  Achievement of funding target. When the DLE was operating there was little
financial risk in exceeding the contracted units target set by the FEFC pro-
viding the extra was delivered at less than £6·50. As a result, colleges
engaging in franchising were more likely to meet or exceed their target
than those that did not.
  Enrolment growth. Again, franchised activity helped colleges show 
high growth rates, particularly in their part-time provision.
  Student continuation. Franchised courses are usually of short duration and
biased towards employees and the employed. Because of this, completion
rates are likely to be higher than for general in-college provision.
  Student achievement.The low guided learning hours and introductory
level of most franchised provision ensures that generally achievement
percentages are well above the average for in-college provision. The fact
that franchisers have a larger percentage of short, low-level courses
enhances their overall rates for retention and achievement.
  Contribution to national training and education targets.There is no obvious
relationship between the percentage of franchised courses and a college’s
contribution to national training and education targets (NTETs).
  ALF. As already discussed, franchising can be used to reduce a college’s ALF.
Generous funding arrangements
The foregoing analysis illustrates just how favourable to franchising the FEFC’s
approach to funding and performance appraisal has been. Such incentives certainly
delivered growth as the ﬁgures in Table 4 illustrate.
These ﬁgures show that 66% of the growth in student numbers in the sector,
over the period 1995/96 to 1996/97, was accounted for by collaborative provision.
In 1995/96 it was 80%. In terms of funding units the comparative percentages
are 41% and 50% respectively. Franchising was clearly a success story driven by
very generous funding arrangements.
Table 4. Proportion of collaborative provision
FEFCstudentnumbers(millions) FEFC funding units (millions)
Collaborative Collaborative
Period Total provision % Total provision %
1994–95 2·6 0·1 5 146 3 2
1995–96 3·1 0·5 18 163 10 6
1996–97 3·4 0·7 19 173 15 9
1997–98* 3·7 0·7 19 176 13 8
*Provisional32
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Explaining the uneven take-up
Despite its obvious attraction the incidence of franchising was not evenly dis-
tributed across the colleges. FEFC ﬁgures for 1997/98 show that 153 colleges
planned no franchised activity in that year and a further 52 indicated that less
than 2% of their units would be delivered by that means. The average for all colleges
was 5·82% with 30 colleges accounting for 69% of all collaborative provision
planned. Even within these 30 colleges there were large differences with less
than half of them being responsible for nearly 50% of the sector’s planned
collaborative provision in 1997/98. These ﬁgures exclude much intermediate
collaboration involving a college seconding employees from an employer or private
provider. The provision delivered by these seconded staff is reported as in-college
rather than franchised units although most or all of it is carried out on the
premises of third parties using staff primarily employed by the client company.
The ﬁnancial beneﬁt in 1996/97 of franchising to the 15 or 20 colleges that
accounted for the majority of the activity was huge. Although individual college
ﬁgures have never been published by the FEFC it can be roughly estimated from
published ﬁgures. FEFC Council news 37 stated that the:
amount of funding per unit transferred by colleges to their partners has
ranged from under £2·49 to over £20·00. The estimated median amount 
of funding transferred is £6·50.
The same source goes on to say that ‘the Council estimates that 51% of all col-
laborative provision is within college funding agreements’. This means that
51% of the provision has been funded at a level above £6·50. Given that the
projected level of collaborative provision in 1996/97 was 17 million units it means
that about 8·67 million units were funded within college core allocations. These
units would have been incorporated into their cores, via the bidding process, at
an average bid-funding rate of approximately £15·65 per unit. This means that
in 1996/97 these colleges received about £15·65 per unit for these 8·67 million
units while paying collaborators an average of £6·50 per unit. Using this logic
the activity yielded a surplus of just less than £80 million in that year. This means
that something in excess of £40 million was handed out to about 15 colleges via
this mechanism. They could use this additional funding to cross-subsidise their
in-college activity.
The quality of collaborative provision had been questioned by many in the
sector and was the subject of a special report published by the FEFC in February
1998. This work was carried out by the FEFC Inspectorate and highlighted a
number of signiﬁcant criticisms of franchised activity. The report’s summary begins
by stating that ‘no inherent weaknesses were found in collaborative provision’
but goes on to acknowledge some serious shortcomings with signiﬁcant aspects33
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of it (FEFC, 1998). These ranged from the strategic level – ‘few strategic plans
[of colleges] address fully how collaborative work ﬁts with the college mission
or how it relates to curriculum planning within the colleges’ – to operational
deﬁciencies such as inadequate pre-guidance, on-course support and progression
and resource problems in respect of learning environments, learning resources
and disabled access. On the positive side it highlighted that:
The best franchised provision has widened participation in further
education and afforded opportunities to employees to gain national
vocational qualiﬁcations (NVQs), particularly the long term unemployed
and other disadvantaged groups. FEFC, 1998
The report itself contains very little quantitative analysis. Rather it tries to highlight
and disseminate good practice. Unfortunately this approach makes it very difﬁ-
cult to quantify, in terms of the overall provision, the balance between the strengths
and weaknesses identiﬁed. The most serious weaknesses seem to be the lack of
strategic justiﬁcation: the franchised provision did not ﬁt a college’s mission and
had inadequate quality controls.
The available evidence presented and analysed so far strongly suggests that
the growth of franchising is largely explainable in terms of its ﬁnancial attrac-
tiveness. It could be argued that the FEFC created such a favourable environment
that colleges who neglected franchising were not acting in the best interests of
their organisation.
The growing excesses of franchising were not being publicly acknowledged
by the FEFC but the 1997/98 funding methodology began to reﬂect concerns about
aspects of it. The changes introduced were further inﬂuenced by the Government’s
decision early in 1997 to withdraw its open-ended ﬁnancial backing for the DLE.
Taken together these measures discouraged further growth. However, two signiﬁ-
cant problems remained to be tackled:
  The small number of colleges whose ﬁnancial viability 
was dependent on large-scale franchising
  The inconsistencies in the tariff which made 
it such a proﬁtable activity.
Convergence debate
Both of these problems were further exacerbated by the FEFC’s decision to move
to convergence to a single ALF for all colleges and HE institutions by 2000/01.
At ﬁrst sight this decision appeared to be rooted in equity and common sense.
Despite its apparent merit it was not universally welcomed. A representative of
the ‘principals of low-cost colleges’ expressed the frustration of his group in the
following terms:34
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We have suffered four years of low funding, and now we have the 
prospect of another four years of a convergency strategy that has 
been proved not to work.
At the other extreme of the debate, colleges with high ALFs claimed that their
particular circumstances justiﬁed additional funding and that its withdrawal
would damage or destroy the provision available to groups under-represented
in further education. The score-keeping accountants sat on the sidelines of this
debate and pointed to the difﬁcult ﬁnancial position of colleges and suggested
that convergence could drive a growing number of them into bankruptcy.
These comments and the growing pressure to reopen the debate on conver-
gence could have been dismissed as special pleading if two important assump-
tions were valid: the tariffs applied accurately reﬂected the relative costs of
delivering different qualiﬁcation aims; the median ALF for the sector was a fair
comparator of efﬁciency. Unfortunately, as already discussed, the growth, nature
and economics of franchising raised serious questions about the validity of both
these assumptions.
Whether the ALF is a fair comparator depends critically on whether there is
a tendency for colleges with low ALFs to also have a high percentage of their
total units earned from franchising. The comparison of the percentage of fran-
chising units with funded ALF for 1997/98 forms Annex 1 of the report (FEFC,
1998). This shows that there were great disparities in the relationship but tends
to support the hypothesis that colleges with high percentages of franchising had
lower funded ALFs than those with low percentages.
This evidence gives weight to the contention that convergence based on ALFs
as presently calculated is ﬂawed because there is potentially an important element
of systematic bias favouring colleges who deliver a signiﬁcant proportion of their
units via franchising. This convergence would produce further transfers of FEFC
funding from colleges whose mission concentrates on meeting the FE needs of
their localities with in-college provision to those who have found salvation by
expanding the percentage of their units delivered by franchising.
Against this background the FEFC produced its funding methodology for
1998/99 which revealed two main priorities: the achievement of funding con-
vergence by 2000/01; modiﬁcation of the tariff to reduce funding to certain
curriculum areas and types of delivery.
The extent of the convergence beneﬁt to colleges with substantial percentages of
franchised activity was reduced by the FEFC’s approach to funding in 1997/98.
In that year much of the DLE funded growth was consolidated into core funding
but it was done in a way which reduced the cash beneﬁt to colleges with large
amounts of DLE funding. As the group of colleges with the highest proportion35
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of DLE funding was largely coterminous with those with signiﬁcant percentages
of franchising the full potential ﬁnancial beneﬁts of convergence were denied
the franchisers. However, as the example below illustrates, these colleges still
beneﬁted signiﬁcantly from the methodology:
  College X currently delivers 500000 units in college and 300000 units 
via franchising. Its ALF for in-college work is £17·20 and it pays its 
subcontractors an average of £6·50 per unit.
  FEFC funding for college X in 1997/98 was £10·55 million.
  College X’s ALF was £13·1875 (£10·55m for 800000 units).
If the FEFC had decided to fund all units at £16·20 then college X would have
had its allocation increased by £2·41 million in 1998/99 (£3·0125 per unit ×
800000). Instead of this approach it decided to introduce a two-tier system
under which colleges with an ALF in 1997/98 of less than £16·20 would receive
in 1998/99 £16·20 for all in-college units and its 1997/98 ALF for all franchised
units. The effect of this approach on college X is illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5. Two-tier system effect on college X
1998–99 Funding £1m
In-college 500000 at £16·20 8·1
Franchised 300000 at £13·1875 3·96
Total funding — — 12·06
The increase in funding enjoyed by college X is just more than £1·5 million. The
ironic consequence is that evidence suggests that most, if not all, of this £1·5 million
will be available to cross-subsidise its in-college provision. Using the ﬁgures in
Table 5, its in-college work could operate at an ALF of £20·20 ([£12·06m − £1·95m
paid to subcontractors] ÷500000). This occurs when the declared aim of conver-
gence is to treat all colleges equally. A college undertaking only in-college work
at an ALF of £20·20 would have received a substantial cut in funding in 1998/99,
since its ALF would have been reduced to £16·20.
The above illustration shows that the FEFC’s decision to introduce a two-tier
convergence system which distinguishes between in-college and franchised pro-
vision reduced the amount of additional funding being awarded to colleges with
high levels of franchising. However, it still allowed them to beneﬁt signiﬁcantly
at the expense of colleges with little or no franchised provision. This aspect further
underscores the beneﬁt of franchising to college ﬁnances. The above example
illustrates the positive beneﬁt to colleges with low ALFs and high levels of fran-
chising. However, those with high ALFs and high levels of franchising do even36
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better from the methodology. It needs to be recognised though that the number
of colleges in the ﬁrst category far exceeds those in the second.
The FEFC has tackled with vigour the aspects of its unit tariff system that facili-
tated franchising. Its tightening pincer has operated by removing certain qualiﬁ-
cations from the funding schedule, such as diving, navigation, and reducing the
unit credit for other popular franchised programmes. This approach has been fairly
successful in reducing the proﬁtability of some franchising provision. However,
the response of some colleges has been to consolidate their franchising in areas
where the tariff remains generous (basic ITin particular) and look for innovative
ways to transform franchised work into an in-college activity usually by second-
ing staff from the outside organisation involved.
This broad analysis of franchising raises a number of important questions
for colleges, the FEFC and the Government. These will now be addressed in the
following section.
Important questions raised by franchising
Role of FEFC in developing franchising
The extent to which the FEFC consciously supported and encouraged the growth
of franchising is difﬁcult to determine. There is no evidence that the initial funding
methodology that was so supportive to franchising was designed with that in
mind. The prize for inventing it must go to that small group of principals who
saw the opportunity and developed such diverse and innovative ways to exploit
the methodology. A more difﬁcult question to answer is why the FEFC moved
so slowly and indecisively to curb even the more extreme practices. This failure
allowed the 15–20 colleges who account for more than 50% of all franchised
activity to make very large surpluses from this work and use it to cross-subsidise
their in-college provision.
The FEFC’s public stance of franchising has been to be very supportive of it
and to stress its positive aspects. This is illustrated in the Council’s view of fran-
chising expressed to the Education and Employment Committee of the House
of Commons:
The Council sees franchising as a mode of delivering further education
rather than a separate type of provision and to see the level of funding as
an empirical question which should be considered in the context of the
review of the tariff which is undertaken annually by an expert group
chaired by Sir Roy Harding.
Inspection evidence conﬁrms that there are no inherent weaknesses 
in franchised provision. There is both good and poor practice, as with 
all provision. This is more clearly differentiated by the management 37
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and quality assurance arrangements in particular colleges than by the 
type of franchised provision.
In April 1996 the Council published a circular entitled Franchising,
which gave guidance on arrangements for franchised-out/off-site collabo-
rative provision. In the light of the circular some colleges have begun to
develop explicit quality standards for franchised provision as an integral
part of their quality assurance arrangements. The best practice includes:
  Strategic commitment to franchised provision
  Clear lines of communication with collaborative partners
  The identiﬁcation of staff with a responsibility for regular monitoring
and reporting on the quality of teaching
  Thoroughly documented procedures for quality assurance
  The provision of teaching and learning materials that are customised 
to the needs of the client. 
Given the signiﬁcance of franchising in the sector and the growing disquiet about
aspects of its operation, it was a surprisingly low-key and uncritical statement.
The FEFC statement did go on to refer to the conclusions of the Secretary of
State’s working group on collaborative partnerships in further education that
was established to address concern regarding control issues, additionality and
the pace and scale of franchised provision in the sector. The working group
produced its interim report in March 1997 (see Council news38). Its main con-
clusions were that:
  It would be wrong to oppose the principles of franchising
  Franchising increases the risks associated with lack of adequate quality con-
trol, particularly where provision is made at some distance from the college
  Similarly there are risks associated with the substitution of public 
funding, through franchising, for provision which would have 
occurred without such funding
  Although the main responsibility for employer-led training must 
continue to be borne by employers themselves there is a case in 
principle for some degree of public funding
  It would be inappropriate to limit the role of FE colleges 
to their local areas.
These conclusions indicate a more critical and wary attitude to franchising than
the FEFC’s statements. However, they still fail to highlight the cost differential
and the resultant ability to cross-subsidise in-college provision. This signiﬁcant
omission is being addressed in a cost study which the FEFC has commissioned
from KPMG. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, it will compare the costs38
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of funding qualiﬁcation aims by direct provision and by franchising. At the time
of writing this study has not been released but its ﬁndings should simply conﬁrm
that a signiﬁcant cost differential does exist (see Chapter 7). A more pertinent
question is whether such a study was necessary given that the FEFC carried out
a full survey of colleges to establish how much each paid per unit to their fran-
chising partners. This was completed in 1997. Its ﬁndings have not been published,
neither have the results been used to calculate the extent to which some colleges
have been able to cross-subsidise. This seems to suggest that identifying and elimi-
nating surpluses arising from franchising was not a policy objective – a conclusion
which appears to have been conﬁrmed by the treatment of franchised units in the
convergence measures introduced within the 1998/99 funding methodology.
On the available evidence, measures taken, data published and public state-
ments made, it is difﬁcult to avoid concluding that once franchising began to
develop and deliver low-cost growth its reduction or elimination was not an
FEFC priority. Understandably, the Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) required
that the impact on colleges of any proposed changes be fully exempliﬁed before
they were endorsed. This, together with the length of the funding cycle, ensured
that alterations to the tariff occurred slowly, inﬂuencing the rate of response to
the franchiser’s selective use of the tariff. In the period since the removal of the
demand-led element the FEFC’s changes to the tariff and its advice on out-of-area
franchising have made it more difﬁcult for the large-scale franchisers. To some
extent these negative pressures have been diluted by the favourable treatment of
franchising in the mechanism of convergence and the failure to address strongly
either out-of-area franchising or the technical mechanisms used to transform
franchised activities into in-college provision.
Impact on sector’s ﬁnancial position
As has already been seen, franchising did provide a large percentage of the sector’s
growth in student numbers and units. This outcome reﬂected positively on colleges
as far as the previous Government was concerned. It also allowed some colleges
to reduce dramatically their ALF per unit by cross-subsidising in-college activity
from low-cost franchising. This particularly occurred when colleges were allowed
to incorporate franchising into their funded cores. Unfortunately, these selective
reductions in ALFs convinced the Government that continued high levels of pro-
ductivity gains could be achieved. This led to a rapid decline in ALF and £16·20
a unit being set for convergence, a ﬁgure considerably below the mean ALF for
in-college provision.
The ﬁnancial health of the sector has suffered badly from the rapid reduction
in ALF. Non-franchising colleges have found it very difﬁcult to cut costs fast enough
to avoid deﬁcits. This has led to an increasing number of colleges moving into the39
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FEFC’s category C for ﬁnancial health – a classiﬁcation that requires a recovery
plan to be produced and the direct and regular involvement of the Council. In
1994,the percentage of colleges in categories A, B and C were 70%, 25% and 5%
respectively. By 1996, the pattern was 45%, 35% and 20% (FEFC). This repre-
sents a very serious deterioration that is largely attributable to the rapid reduc-
tion in college ALFs.
This rapid reduction in funding was made worse by the redistributive effect
of franchising. The large surpluses available from franchised activities were earned
by a very small number of colleges, leaving the remainder receiving proportion-
ately less funding. This trend was continued in the 1998/99 funding methodology
which, as already described, again treats franchised activity favourably.
The analysis in this chapter strongly suggests that the vast majority of colleges
have suffered ﬁnancially as a result of franchising. This outcome occurred because
it provided the evidence of low cost growth and falling ALFs which the Govern-
ment needed to justify the rapid reduction in unit funding. The surpluses from
franchising activities were distributed among only a small number of colleges.
Impact on quality of provision
The FEFC has concluded that there is no evidence currently available to support
the contention that franchised provision is inherently better or worse in quality
than that delivered in colleges. This conclusion is hardly surprising since much
of the franchised provision was either previously offered at full cost, such as diving,
first aid and coaching skills, or was offered to employees by their employers to
make them useful and productive staff. The FEFC Inspectorate report (1998) on
franchising highlighted a number of signiﬁcant criticisms of its quality. Unfor-
tunately, it did not quantify the extent of good and poor practice. However, a
detailed analysis of the inspection reports of individual colleges indicates that
considerable elements of the franchised provision were characterised by rela-
tively poor practice in terms of teaching and learning and facilities.
The criticisms of franchising are not conﬁned to poor teaching and learning.
The report also expresses particular concern that the growth occurred in the areas
of the curriculum which could be franchised. This produced serious mission drift
or opportunism in individual colleges and because of the scale of franchising
the same tendency applied to the sector as a whole. Growth in the sector was
driven by franchising which, by its nature, was selective. The question of whether
these curriculum areas were priorities for further education was never asked.
Who beneﬁts from franchising?
Many private training companies and large national employers have received con-
siderable amounts of public money as a direct result of their franchise relation-
ships with colleges. This has been used to subsidise existing in-company training40
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programmes and increase the proﬁts of some training providers. These beneﬁts are
small, when compared with the large surpluses earned by the 20 or so colleges
who dominate franchising. The scale of these surpluses is impressive, regardless
of whether they have been used to cross-subsidise in-college provision, invested
in buildings and equipment or spent on high salaries and expenses for top staff.
To balance this ﬁnancial perspective supporters of franchising would point
out that even if some employers, private trainers and a few colleges have done
well out of it, so have the students. This is the cornerstone of the justiﬁcation. On
the face of it, it is difﬁcult to deny. Those wishing to undertake basic ﬁrst aid courses
have been able to do so at a lower cost than would otherwise have been the case.
Cleaners have been able to obtain training to NVQ level, again at a lower cost,
rather than the company’s in-house training scheme that existed prior to fran-
chising, and so on. Some students have received better training, others the same
at lower cost and some have received training they would not otherwise have
received. The question is not ‘were the students disadvantaged?’ – there is little
evidence that they were – but rather ‘was it good value for public money?’ The
answer to the latter question, in most cases, is it was not.
Providers further claim that franchised activity has had a disproportionately
positive impact on widening participation by bringing unqualiﬁed individuals
into lifelong learning. The available evidence suggests that students involved in
franchised provision are less likely to be classiﬁed as widening participation stu-
dents than those in other categories. The reason for this is that most franchised
activity involves short courses and the average short course student is better
qualiﬁed and lives in a less disadvantaged postcode area than the average FEFC
student (FEFC, Franchising: background information, July 1997). It is true that
some franchised activity has signiﬁcantly contributed to widening participation
but in general it has not proportionately contributed.
Future for franchising
Future developments in franchising are difﬁcult to predict because of continuing
uncertainties over the FEFC’s attitude towards it. At present, negative and positive
signals are being given to the sector. On the negative side, some franchised activities
have been removed from funding, that available for direct collaborative ventures
with business organisations has been reduced, and closer investigation of fran-
chises outside a college’s normal geographical and curriculum areas has been pro-
mised. These have been moderated to a signiﬁcant extent by the FEFC’s favourable
treatment of franchising activities in the convergence proposals, continued strong
public support for franchising and the very limited measures taken to stop fran-
chises operating outside a college’s normal geographical area. A number of com-
mercial organisations are offering colleges the opportunity to transform franchises
into in-college activities.41
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The impact of these apparently contradictory signals on the level and nature of
franchising activity in individual colleges will vary considerably. Essentially, the
colleges can be segmented into three groups: large-scale franchisers (about 20);
opportunistic and community franchisers (about 280); and 153 non-franchisers.
It is unlikely in the new climate that any college not currently a large-scale fran-
chiser will become one. As far as non-franchisers are concerned they could move
into the opportunistic category and similarly some in that category could become
non-franchisers. These latter movements will largely reﬂect the ease or difﬁculty
with which individual colleges can meet their FEFC unit target by other means.
The inevitable annual variations in the level of recruitment will ensure that
colleges continue to have a signiﬁcant incentive to move in and out of franchising.
While the approach is understandable it results in the most dangerous form of
franchising with colleges inexperienced in this activity buying units in the com-
mercial market. This can be a challenging and potentially expensive process given
that there is clear evidence of economies of scale in franchising, particularly in
respect to contract negotiation and quality control. Last minute venturesinto the
franchise market are inherently risky in terms of quality control, audit require-
ments and value for money. These risks need to be set against the ﬁnancial ones a
college faces if it fails to meet its unit target. Given the current rules the ﬁnancial
risk will often outweigh those related to franchising and ensure that many col-
leges continue to move between the non-franchising and opportunistic categories
to meet their unit target.
If this prediction on opportunistic franchising is correct its future level will
depend on the relationship between FEFC targets and college recruitment. The
strong ﬁnancial pressures to achieve unit targets will ensure that a large number
of potential franchising colleges will exist at any one time. How many of these
will actually contract franchised units will depend on their cost and how difﬁcult
the FEFC makes it to move in and out of franchising and between collaborative
partners. The increasing strength of the FEFC rules, the audit and quality risks and
the economies of scale make it likely that this type of franchising will decrease
as colleges seek other less risky approaches to the elimination of any projected
deﬁcit on their FEFC units.
The above analysis suggests that the vast majority of colleges will reduce their
level of franchising during the next few years. This downward trend in oppor-
tunistic franchising is not likely to be replicated in community-based franchising.
This provision is characterised by its relatively small scale and its local delivery.
It is generally used to channel FEFC money to community providers who sup-
plement a college’s mission in hard to reach geographical or curriculum areas.
This element is unlikely to be affected by the changes in the rules and is generally
based on long-term relationships. In total, it accounts for a small part of the
overall franchised provision.42
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If the prediction that the majority of colleges will reduce their franchised pro-
vision is correct it will be the 30 colleges who currently account for nearly 70%
of the total activity who will determine the future shape and scale of franchising.
Their attitude will reﬂect the negative pressures they face which are summed up
in the section that follows.
Negative pressures
Convergence. Convergence has introduced a twin ALF, one for in-college pro-
vision and one for franchised provision. Although in the ﬁrst instance the rate for
franchising has been generously set by the FEFC there is the danger that KPMG’s
current consultancy on the relative costs of these two types of delivery will conﬁrm
that franchising costs are considerably less than those for equivalent in-college
provision. If this leads the FEFC to reduce substantially the ALF allowed for fran-
chising then the economics of franchising will be transformed and its ﬁnancial
attractiveness diminished.
Tighteningthetariff. Measures already taken by the FEFC have removed from
funding some of the curriculum areas traditionally favoured for franchising. The
tariff reductions that have been applied to in-company activities have also reduced
their appeal. The FEFC has promised to continue tightening the tariff to ensure
that it properly reﬂects costs. These processes are likely to reduce further the
ﬁnancial attractiveness of those courses which currently account for a high pro-
portion of franchised activity.
Quality. An increasing number of colleges have found that their franchised
activities are reducing their inspection grades in these curriculum areas and for
quality and management.
FEFCguidance.The growing emphasis the FEFC has laid on the need to justify
provision delivered outside a college’s normal geographical and curriculum areas
puts pressure on colleges with a large franchised provision. Although relatively
little has yet been done to enforce this guidance, other colleges are putting on the
pressure to ensure that something is done.
Beneﬁts threatened
Taken together, these four measures are placing increasing pressure on colleges
with a large amount of franchised numbers. This threat is acutely felt because
these colleges have prospered from franchising. In general they have built up
strong ﬁnancial positions and have been able to cross-subsidise their in-college
provision from the large surpluses earned from low cost franchising. Histori-
cally, they have also beneﬁted from the relationship between the FEFC’s contri-
bution to buildings and a college’s ALF. The threats to these beneﬁts are now real
and the colleges only have a limited range of responses available to them.43
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The strength of this threat is illustrated by the growing use of devices which
transform franchising into an in-college activity. The scale of this activity is
growing as the large franchisers grapple with the problem of unit targets which
are considerably in excess of that which they could recruit from their normal geo-
graphical catchment areas. This need has produced a range of innovative solutions
involving commercial partners. These schemes take as their starting point the
requirement to show that the staff delivering the curriculum are, at the time of the
delivery, employed by the college claiming the units. Generally, another organi-
sation provides the premises and equipment and often the staff, but these are,
by various mechanisms, rebadged as college staff for FEFC purposes.
This development meets the large franchisers’ needs to reclassify franchised
units as in-college provision. However, its continued success depends on the FEFC
taking a benign view. First, the scale of franchising operated by the major 15
franchisers is such that this in-college provision will have to operate in a much
larger geographical area than the colleges’ own natural catchment areas. Also
because it is in-college provision they will have to justify setting up branches of
their college in the catchment areas of other institutions. Up until now, the FEFC
has not taken a strong line with such developments. However, if its approach
changes the rebadging will be seriously threatened. In some cases these arrange-
ments may not stand rigorous audit particularly in respect of contracts of em-
ployment and possibly VAT. This strategy also depends on the tariff not being
tightened in the few remaining areas of the curriculum where this approach to
delivery can yield substantial surpluses.
The other major area of work open to the large franchisers is in-company NVQs.
It is possible to develop delivery models for those which are signiﬁcantly cheaper
to operate than the in-college equivalent. The problems with these activities are
that their tariff has been signiﬁcantly reduced and they are more costly to admin-
ister particularly when operated on a limited scale. Some large franchisers will still
work proﬁtably with national organisations that have large numbers of employees/
clients requiring relatively straightforward NVQs such as Customer Care and
Information Technology. However, even in these cases they require the FEFC to
take a continuing benign view of these national activities and to keep the tariff
for this type of franchised provision at its present level.
Conclusions
The outlook for franchised activities is less optimistic than it was. The evidence
seems to point to a substantial reduction during the next few years. The rate of
decline will depend on how hard the FEFC pushes down elements of the tariff
and its attitude to colleges providing signiﬁcant in-college provision outside their44
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normal geographical area. Given the real uncertainties over these elements of
FEFC policy it is difﬁcult to make ﬁrm predictions on either the rate of decline
in franchising or what will replace it. The only sure conclusion is that the large
franchisers are going to have to be very innovative and enterprising if they are to
continue to meet their unit targets and produce the ﬁnancial surpluses on fran-
chised activities on which they have come to rely.
Their activities could also engender considerable conﬂict between colleges at
a time when the Government is looking for cooperation and partnerships rather
than competition and strife. The latter would reﬂect badly on the sector and can
only be avoided if the core unit allocations of colleges with considerable amounts
of franchising are reduced. This could be done over a period of time without
destabilising their ﬁnancial position. They would merely have to follow the path
of cost reduction already followed by many colleges with high ALFs and little
franchising. This approach may placate the Government’s desire for cooperative
action to tackle the participation agenda. However, it may also inhibit the sector’s
ability to meet its expansion targets. The latter concern probably best explains
the FEFC’s currently tentative moves to end large-scale out-of-area franchising.
Its fear of under-recruitment at a sector level may be more imagined than real,
however, since there is a signiﬁcant and increasing number of other colleges
effectively capped on units and thereby discouraged from growing.45
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4.Community-based
collaborative provision
Maggie Gidney
C
ommunity-based outward collaborative provision began in much the
same way as other franchising. It offered an opportunity for colleges
to meet demanding growth targets and in many cases to reduce unit
costs. It also enabled community and voluntary sector organisations to
maintain or develop provision at a time when other sources of funding, such as
European, TEC and local authority sources, were becoming more constrained.
For many, it has been a more acceptable form of outward/off-site collaborative
provision (OCP), with claims being made that it supports the Kennedy widening
participation agenda, helps to achieve local regeneration strategies and empowers
and capacity builds community and voluntary sector organisations. This chapter
will consider the role of community-based OCP in widening participation, the
lessons to be learned and its impact on the sector.
Overall picture
Many colleges have had long-standing arrangements with community-based
organisations. When it became clear that colleges were able to contract with third
parties to deliver training programmes, many chose to extend their relationships
to include outward collaborative provision. Despite the fairly widespread view
that OCP was largely work with employers and private training partners, collabo-
rative arrangements with voluntary sector organisations at 18% outweigh those
with private sector employers (13%). (However, it remains the case that the
highest levels of OCP are with private sector trainers at 54%.) 46
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The FEFC notes that:
In the best examples of collaborative work with community and voluntary
sector organisations, collaborative provision helps colleges to attract people
who might not otherwise participate in further education and training.
They include people from minority ethnic groups and isolated rural
populations and the long-term unemployed. 1998
In many cases these voluntary sector and community organisations can form a
key ﬁrst step in colleges’ attempts to fulﬁl the challenge of the Kennedy agenda.
The collaborative arrangements that colleges operate are usually only part of the
broader strategic and operational networks that operate between themselves and
the organisations.
The Education and Employment Committee identiﬁes an important yardstick
to measure the appropriateness of OCP (franchising):
We believe that high-quality franchising can play a valuable role in the 
FE system, because of the way it can increase participation, extend access
and contribute towards a more skilled workforce. However in order to
achieve this franchising should grow from colleges’ primary tasks of
introducing students to learning – at many levels – and helping them to
progress. The impetus to enter into franchising arrangements should 
be to further this task, rather than simply maximising income.
DfEE, 1998a, para 129
The committee also set clear criteria for quality in locally based OCP: 
Thus students on franchised provision should be, and recognise 
themselves as being as much a part of their parent college as those 
studying at the college itself. DfEE, 1998a, para 132
As with other forms of OCP, not all community-based collaborative provision is
an arrangement between a local college and its community. Community-based
OCP was not immune from the pattern of franchising at a distance created by
a relatively limited number of colleges. In many cases the college which engages
in a franchising agreement with a given community organisation has been dep-
endent on:
  Whether the local college is risk taking or risk averse by nature
  Whether it has funding units to spare47
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  Its ﬁnancial stability and its average level of funding
  Its attitude to growth or to partnerships.
It becomes difﬁcult to sustain the view that community-based OCP achieves a
first step towards the type of serial participation that lifelong learning implies, if
the franchising college is at some distance from the community. If there is no pro-
gression link between a community-based student’s ﬁrst experience or return to
learning and the main local providers of further education, it is difﬁcult to support
the hypothesis that meaningful widening of participation has been achieved.
Without detailed analysis of the type of students and programmes within
community-based OCP, there is no way of knowing whether the students are
actually from groups or areas of underparticipation. For this reason the case for
community-based OCP as a key driver of the Kennedy agenda is not yet proven.
College individualised student record (ISR) information on OCP needs to be
analysed by level, ethnicity, programme area, age, gender and widening partici-
pation factor to evidence OCP’s role in the Kennedy agenda. This needs to be
done whether the widening participation baselines are developed on the basis of
postcodes or on prior educational achievement. The same benchmark information
needs to be available for retention, progression and achievement on OCP.
To ensure comprehensive and strategic approaches to local planning, all pro-
vision within that area’s boundaries needs to be in the public domain. This is not
currently the case. Many of the ﬁrst round FEFC widening participation strategic
partnerships have found that it is difﬁcult to develop a meaningful participation
plan for the area, when the data on local participation is incomplete. Local colleges,
TECs and local authorities may share their data and through analysis identify
geographical areas with underparticipating client groups. However, there may
also be substantial numbers of widening participation OCP students who do
not appear on such participation maps. It is difﬁcult to develop a meaningful
understanding of adequacy and sufﬁciency if part of the picture is missing.
Nevertheless, there is anecdotal evidence to indicate that community-based
OCP undertaken within a regional strategy between local FE colleges and other
agencies can be beneﬁcial to both parties. The most successful OCP could help
to draw voluntary and community organisations into the new local learning
partnerships in a structured and meaningful way. Colleges may be well advised
to work strategically with a range of other local providers if the new demanding
student targets are to be met. Despite these uncertainties, there are lessons to
be learned from the ﬁrst phase of community OCP.48
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Key lessons
Added value
There are aspects of voluntary and community sector approaches to education
and training which complement those of further education. Community organi-
sations may offer programmes which are closely tailored to the specialised com-
munity which they serve. For example, they may work with a particular estate,
a speciﬁc age range or ethnic-minority group. They often base their programmes
in locations which are used for multiple activities by their client group and are
seen as familiar, welcoming environments. In the challenge to widen partici-
pation these organisations can play an important role.
Where local colleges develop collaborative arrangements with such organisa-
tions they may gain a number of advantages. Often their own environments may
seem more alien and less welcoming, larger and more impersonal to the people
these organisations serve, people who potentially could fall within a widening
participation group. Such potential students may well feel that they will vanish
in the college or that their needs will not be met. In a collaborative arrangement
the community organisation could act as a friendly gatekeeper to the wider
college programmes.
Through sharing its quality procedures, curriculum and qualiﬁcation know-
how, the college may be able to play a signiﬁcant role in community empow-
erment and development. Some colleges have looked at introducing joint staff
development, mentoring and capacity building programmes alongside their OCP
arrangements. The culture and the systems of the college may be challenged and
improved by such activities. This may then assist the college to consider the
requirements of more ﬂexible programmes and different client groups. College
staff may gain deeper skills and understanding of the communities they serve.
It is likely that there will be signiﬁcant cultural change in both organisations.
The voluntary or community organisations also have something to gain. Such
organisations often suffer from short-term initiative funding approaches which
make it difﬁcult for them to plan long term. These organisations have often had
to drop programmes almost as soon as they are started. They also ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to sustain long-term stafﬁng arrangements where offers of employment are linked
to annual or project funding cycles. A strategic and long-term OCP arrangement
with a college can offer some ﬁnancial and programme stability. Although FE
colleges have an annual funding round, in many senses their funding agreements
are relatively stable compared to project-based funding. If this is reﬂected in
their OCP contracts, even greater stability for the community organisation may
be achieved.49
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The college can provide a range of expertise in accreditation development, delivery
of nationally recognised qualiﬁcations, sustained staff development in teaching
and learning, support strategies, counselling and student services and learning
centres. Many colleges have robust ﬁnancial, information management and quality
assurance procedures which can sustain and enhance internal procedures in the
OCP partner. They may have greater representation on local strategic forums,
better access to and capacity to bid for alternative funding sources and greater
ﬂexibility to support the cash ﬂow difﬁculties brought by some external funding
sources such as those relating to European Union (EU) grants.
Potential problems
However, the relationship is not free from problems for both parties. Colleges
may limit the beneﬁt they gain from this closer tie with the community. OCP
arrangements may be held within a speciﬁc department and relationships with
community organisations may not permeate and inform the broader college
culture, systems and curriculum. The management of the OCP may be held by
one or at best a small group of managers and as a result not be seen as a core
activity by the staff as a whole. It may be treated differently by everyone, from
those involved in the delivery of learning to the ﬁnance staff. The FEFC notes:
The majority of trainees do not have access to the full range of services
including initial guidance, additional learning support, tutorials, careers
guidance and counselling, which are available to students on the main 
sites of a college. 1998, p9
An important perceived difference is the approach to the provision of additional
learning support (ALS) funding units in OCP. Again the FEFC notes:
In the majority of partnerships, the needs of students with learning
difﬁculties and disabilities are not taken into account in planning
provision, tutors are not trained to recognise or support students 
with learning difﬁculties. 1998, p11
There seems to be confusion about the eligibility and procedures for claiming
ALS funding for OCP work. A further disincentive to ensure such funding within
OCP is the fact that many see the administration of ALS as overly bureaucratic
and would not wish to extend this to OCP.
Although the FEFC report does not differentiate between types of OCP it 
is likely that these weaknesses apply equally to community-based provision. It
should not be assumed that community-based provision focuses on Entry level
and Level 1 work, or that there is a higher need for ALS or guidance. However, if
widening participation to disadvantaged and underparticipating groups is seen50
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to be part of the role of community-based OCP, the unequal access to guidance
and support is likely to be problematic.
The embedding of activities and relationships is important in all OCP. For
example, in employer-based OCP valuable opportunities to update skills and to
inform curriculum development and delivery may be lost if full partnership with
OCP organisations is not encouraged. Similarly, in voluntary and community-
based OCP, if expertise in attracting and delivering appropriate programmes to
widen participation is not exploited the college may miss a valuable opportunity
to play an active and direct role in local regeneration. Also, if such partnerships
are not fully developed, it leaves the voluntary sector organisation, yet again,
feeling used and undervalued.
Another contentious area may be short-term agreements with OCP partners.
Colleges may seek to use OCP as a buffer zone if they are operating on the margins
of underachieving or achieving unit targets. This variable approach to funding
is likely to have profound effects on the college’s relationship with the community.
There is a long history of unequal relationships between community organisa-
tions and statutory ones such as FE colleges, where the voluntary sector is only
approached when convenient. Many feel they never get a seat with any power
on the strategic local agencies and groups. To start and then drop OCP arrange-
ments can only cause harm to local relationships and to the community-based
student client groups.
Preparing for partnerships
If colleges decide to begin or maintain OCP in community-based provision, they
need to consider if there are any conﬂicts between the proposed partner organi-
sation and the college in terms of culture, ethos and reputation. Information on
the track record of the organisation is likely to be available locally since it is
likely to have existing contracts with the local authority, TEC or other agencies.
Where this is not the case, the college needs to put in place even more rigorous
checks. It will need to consider the political implications of allying itself to an
organisation, particularly where communities are fragmented and antagonistic.
As with any other OCP, colleges need to ensure that there is a clear rationale
for their involvement with the voluntary and community sector. The rationale for
speciﬁc OCP developments should be borne out by their needs analysis, strategic
planning and self-assessment processes and embedded in department opera-
tional plans and targets.
The impact on all college systems needs to be considered and adequate res-
ources put in place to plan, monitor and evaluate the work. Unlike large con-
tracts with private training providers or with employers, some OCP contracts51
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with community and voluntary sector organisations may be quite small. As with
other projects and programmes, the college would be well advised to undertake
a full business planning exercise for its OCP, ensuring that costs, income and
payment streams, risks and sensitivities are determined. Community-based OCP
does bring speciﬁc quality assurance issues that need to be addressed. Many com-
munity organisations operate with very limited revenue. Where they are required
to meet the FEFC paper trail, their systems may creak under the strain. Colleges
need to be aware of this and customise existing documentation and procedures
to accommodate the speciﬁc challenges set by this provision while maintaining
a clear and robust audit trail.
Community and voluntary sector organisations may experience cash ﬂow
problems which need careful monitoring by the college, to ensure, wherever pos-
sible, that the college is not adding to the difﬁculties. The college also needs to
ensure that the contracted programmes are delivered to the agreed standard des-
pite any ﬁnancial constraints within the OCP organisation. For colleges this may
present additional difﬁculties compared to other OCP. These OCP agreements
may be very small scale yet will require the same levels of monitoring and perhaps
a disproportionate level of management time. The college may wish to set mini-
mum contract sizes to address this problem.
Perhaps more than other organisations, voluntary sector organisations are
used to having to manage multiple small income sources to sustain programmes.
Colleges need to be vigilant that they are not offering double funding for a pro-
gramme; for example by funding a project which is already in receipt of funds
from a local authority. Voluntary sector organisations may also be in the vanguard
of the transition between Non-schedule 2 and Schedule 2 work. Colleges should
carry out adequate checks and balances to ensure that the programmes are
eligible for FEFC funding.
Colleges will need to make a judgement between the value of friendly and acces-
sible accommodation and accommodation which does not meet the college’s
standard for direct provision. At the very least it needs to meet health and safety
requirements. Colleges will also need to consider the cultural ﬁt between stafﬁng
approaches in the OCP partner and the college. Use of volunteers, different con-
tractual arrangements, levels of professional development and pay scales may all be
a cause of concern for college staff. They may see community-based OCP as a cheap
option and may infer that it is of a lesser quality or a lower challenge to themselves
or their profession. If the provision is to be an integral part of the college response
to the community in the way the Select Committee suggests, it must be seen as equal
to other provision by staff and students alike. This may need proactive approaches
by managers within the college to ensure that the OCP is widely understood.52
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Future of community-based collaborative provision
With the change in the demand-led element of funding and the effective unit cap
imposed until 1999/2000, growth has ceased to be as attractive for some colleges.
As a result, they may have retrenched to core, fully-funded activities. For a college
with a low ALF, where OCP units are not converged to a higher ALF, there may
be additional corporate pressure to shift OCP funding units to direct delivery.
However, there is some indication that where community-based OCP has been
developed as part of a broader strategic approach to working with the community
and voluntary sector, colleges are seeking ways to sustain this area of work.
Colleges are likely to be considering a range of options including recrafting com-
munity OCP programmes to bring them more directly under college control.
This is not without problems. Colleges need to ensure that any new arrangements
are not just a device for achieving additional funding. They should be within the
spirit and letter of the FEFC funding methodology and the guidance on OCP.
A move to more direct control may become unacceptable to the OCP partner
since it may fundamentally undermine its autonomy in the longer term.
There is also evidence of colleges withdrawing from community-based OCP
and seeking to translate units into growth of their core programmes. This may
undermine their relationship with the local community and prove to be short-
sighted with the demanding challenge to widen participation to a further 700000
students just over the horizon.
The move towards making local provision the priority is also having an effect.
Some colleges operating OCP at a distance are seeking to return community-
based OCP to local colleges. It is not clear whether or not they are equally keen
to return units and associated funding. However, receiving colleges may only
be able to take over local OCP if they have difﬁculty in meeting unit targets or
gain additional units and funding to sustain the work. Many colleges involved in
large-scale OCP have had to develop robust monitoring and quality assurance
arrangements, sophisticated management and support procedures and expertise
in working with community and voluntary organisations, which the local college
may not have.53
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The new targets for sector growth will once again set challenges to the FEFC
and the FE colleges to deliver the widening participation agenda. As part of its
response to this challenge, the sector will be concerned to ensure that growth cap-
italises on the strengths and capacity of community and voluntary sector organ-
isations, but will be wary of another OCP boom. Community-based partners may
also be wary of renewing relationships if they see this as a boom and bust cycle that
they have experienced all too frequently in the past. However, to overlook this
form of OCP will make the demanding growth targets more difﬁcult to achieve.
The standards agenda will also need to be addressed in community-based OCP
as in other provision. Participation, retention, achievement and progression are
likely to be at issue in this form of delivery as within provision in main site pro-
grammes. OCP will need to be benchmarked against national and local baselines,
with targets for improvement set.
Such provision will also need to be drawn into new initiatives such as the Uni-
versity for Industry, with community-based learning centres being seen as an
important local resource for computer and communications mediated delivery.
Revenue streams will need to be available to sustain the centres’ operation.
Community-based OCP may be an appropriate mechanism to supply the gate-
way and support services the centres will need.
Community-based OCP has clearly had an impact on the sector. At its best
it has enhanced and strengthened local networks, has widened participation and
access and developed expertise and knowledge in the college and with the OCP
partner. Nevertheless its contribution to widening participation seems yet to be
proven, although its importance to the Kennedy agenda remains a widely held
belief. This type of OCP seems likely to endure at least in the short term, despite
some retrenchment. A more strategic approach to regional planning and delivery
would seem to imply that there is a logic to consolidating funding streams so that
a small organisation does not have to deal with TECs, colleges and local authorities
to sustain a small number of programmes and services. Whether colleges and
OCP arrangements become the most appropriate model for funding education
and training in the voluntary and community sector seems open to question.54
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5.Franchising 
andcore provision
Birmingham University School of Education
Preliminary evidence and context
The FEFC has deﬁned franchising as ‘education for students being delivered
away from a college’s premises by or with the assistance of a third party’ (1996,
p3). In contrast, core work is what a college does with its own staff (typically,
but not exclusively, on its own premises). Franchising has been a high-proﬁle issue
for the FE sector, raising important questions about mission and purpose, as
well as impinging on the efﬁcacy of the funding methodology. This investigation
looks at the relationship between franchising and the core of the college’s work.
As has been seen in previous chapters, there are several ﬁnancial incentives
for colleges to undertake franchising. Colleges:
  Can grow through franchising and can raise extra revenues as surpluses;
this arises where colleges have a cost advantage relative to the tariff 
and so can expand pockets of provision
  May franchise so as to maintain their proﬁle and reputation vis-à-vis
other colleges (Leney et al., 1998); the demand-led element (DLE) 
allowed colleges to expand, with the FEFC underwriting such 
expansion, albeit at a lower rate of funding
  With low average levels of funding (ALFs) receive higher percentage
allocations under the bidding process and a higher percentage FEFC
contribution to their building projects; these colleges are best placed 
to expand their franchising (Styles, 1997b). 55
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External agencies also have an incentive to obtain franchising agreements, in
terms of the income they could receive from the FEFC, the educative input they
would receive from the colleges to improve the standards of provision and the
accreditation they would receive for the participants. (This deﬁnition of fran-
chising differs from common usage: typically, franchisees pay to use the name
and operational technique of the franchiser.)
Given these incentives, and the widespread presumption that franchised pro-
vision is well funded under the FEFC tariff, this chapter hypothesises that colleges
have obtained and pursued franchised provision in order to subsidise their core
provision. To test this hypothesis it is important to be clear about the quality and
resources for franchising. If franchising is comparable to core provision then there
need be no concern over its prevalence. If colleges cannot make a proﬁt on fran-
chising then there is no opportunity to cross-subsidise the core. However, as will
be discussed later, the core needs to be deﬁned and in a way which is not con-
tentious. The different deﬁnitions that abound reﬂect a fragmented view of the
mission and purpose of the FE sector.
On quality, the FEFC cites inspection evidence of:
no inherent weaknesses in franchising as a mechanism for the delivery 
of vocational education and training … [or with quality assurance, if]
senior management commitment, resources and monitoring 
arrangements are in place. 1997b, p8
On resources, the FEFC, against an underlying perception that franchising is
lucrative, does recognise that considerable effort is needed for quality assurance,
particularly when the franchising is off site.
On the core, Kennedy notes that a:
lack of vision informing clear strategic priorities has led to the danger 
of a fragmented sector, split between [inter alia]: franchising versus 
direct provision colleges. FEFC, 1997c, Annex A, p5
The circular also observes that:
the funding methodology could be amended to encourage collaboration
rather than competition between institutions. This could be a more
effective strategy for reaching those who do not at present participate 
in further education. p8
National data and information from visits and data collection at eight case study
colleges is used to test the chapter’s hypothesis and explore questions of quality.
This then leads into considerations of:
  What use colleges have made of opportunities and revenues from franchising
  Whether or not franchised provision should be funded, and if so, how.56
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There are large amounts of data at the national level and these are useful for ex-
ploring trends. However, in order to understand and analyse the effects of the
funding formula, the views of college professionals were also sought along with
documentary evidence from the case studies.
Findings from aggregate data
The national data is a useful starting point to establish the growth of the sector
and the extent of increases in the diversity of funding. Table 6 indicates the scale
of collaborative provision. With a total of 700000 students (the majority of
them part time), collaborative provision (CP) represents 10% of all provision
(as registered in terms of funding units [FUs]).
Table 6. Growth in collaborative provision
Source: FEFC, 1997d
CP CP/total CP FUs  CP FUs/
(millions) students (millions) total FUs
1994/95 0·1 5% 3 2%
1995/96 0·5 18% 12 7%
1996/97 0·7 19% 17 10%
Between 1994/95 and 1996/97 franchise enrolments rose sevenfold; more than
280 colleges are involved in franchising although 20 of the largest franchisers
provide 58% of the total franchised provision (FEFC, 1997a). Franchise enrol-
ments are clustered by subject: notably in health and community care, IT, computing
and sports. Most franchised provision is at Entry or Level 1 and may be with
private or public sector employers, with schools, sports bodies or community
associations (FEFC, 1996, p6).
The national data suggests two points. First, franchised provision is different
from the rest of FE provision in terms of student body, curriculum and level.
The signiﬁcance of this difference needs to be investigated. Second, franchising
has created a cluster of around 20 college providers which, in terms of national
statistics, are unlike the remainder of the sector; this dissimilarity may undermine
notions of a common FE sector being well served by a common sector-wide
funding methodology. However, as Gravatt (1997) notes, detailed aggregate
information on franchised provision is difﬁcult to uncover. Given the scale and
growth of such provision and concerns about its nature, distribution and scale,
the limited volume of publicly reported national data is a matter of concern and
perpetuates suspicion about quality.57
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Findings from college data
Using data on provision from individual colleges is informative. Out of the eight
case study colleges, two undertake no off-site franchised provision, ﬁve are small-
scale franchisers and one is involved in large-scale franchise provision. This
reasonably mirrors activity in the sector as a whole. The analysis of this data and
other relevant information suggests that the franchise market may be segmented
into three groups: large-scale franchisers, opportunistic franchisers and strategic
(non-) franchisers. These practices are described in more detail below. The quality
of franchise provision and the effects of franchising in fragmenting the sector
will then be considered.
Colleges’ franchise activity
The colleges that did not franchise conﬁrmed that franchising was contrary to
the mission of their institution. They argued that their strategic direction militated
against franchising, both in terms of students (‘our target group is not amenable
to franchised provision’) and staff (‘if the college had wanted to franchise we
would have selected our staff complement differently’). However, as evidenced
from the other case studies, these arguments do not preclude small-scale fran-
chising. Instead, it may have been that these non-franchisers were able more
easily to forgo the additional income from franchising through a conﬂuence of
positive circumstances:
  Changes to the local demography with increasing enrolment 
from a greater catchment
  A relative windfall fund when the DLE ended
  Changes in the productivity through new conditions of service for staff. 
For the small-scale franchisers in our sample, mission was important and it
guides the type of franchising done. Perhaps in consequence of this, the motives
for franchising in each case were idiosyncratic. At the case study college in Wales,
the emphasis was on supporting local provision. Despite competition between
colleges in previous years, this was a view held by the neighbouring colleges.
The college had only one franchise contract with the local education authority
(LEA) for adult non-vocational work. The volume was modest, representing
around 5% of total college income.
At one of the general FE colleges in the study, early franchising had been lucrative
but it was soon realised that high-quality franchising required a resource com-
mitment as great as that given to on-site provision. As a result, the college has
developed a high-quality work-based learning programme which, being off site,
might be thought to be similar to franchising except that the college’s own staff58
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worked with the employees. It is therefore deﬁned as core provision. At a second
college, despite frequent opportunities for negotiated franchise deals and a broad
subject complement, only a very small proportion of franchised provision was
undertaken (around one-ﬁftieth of the total provision). This college preferred the
growth to be internal. However, it is also clear that senior management had not
anticipated that franchising would last. The third general FE college regarded
franchising as part of a local imperative for widening participation and exporting
its educational standards to external agencies.
Some colleges were opportunistic in their adoption of franchising on a small
scale. One college had franchised in order to increase its total units and so reduce
its ALF. One sixth-form college was franchising a small amount of provision
with a national provider of ﬁrst aid. This provision, which appeared relatively
lucrative, would be used to ‘buttress the mission’. This college’s imperative to
franchise depended on the potential for growth through other sources. With
growing enrolments and more healthy 16–19 provision than for some years in
terms of enrolment and student in-take characteristics, the college acknowledged
that, in terms of the funding method, this was ‘growth in the wrong area’.
However, franchising was a low-risk opportunity to increase resources to the
college at the margin.
The motives of large-scale franchisers are more problematical. It may be
possible for such colleges to argue that they have always had partnerships in the
community and that franchising is just a change of name and funding arrange-
ment, as was argued by the large-scale provider interviewed for this study. For
others, franchising is seen as a legitimate substitute for ‘traditional employer
day-release courses that were the backbone to much of “old” further education’
(Leney et al., 1998, p27).
However, this argument cannot be invoked for the nature of much of the rapid
growth in franchising that has happened during the past few years. More legit-
imate may be the argument that such colleges are creating access for groups
under-represented, with franchised provision being a valid part of the FE remit
despite its atypical proﬁle.
The large-scale franchiser in the case studies had encountered signiﬁcant
management problems because of alterations to its applications for funding. In
negotiations with the FEFC, the college has criticised the failure of the FEFC to
understand and accommodate its mission and the abrupt withdrawal of DLE
funding. The college has cancelled provision and had to consider either merger,
rationalisation of its provision into the local area or conversion of franchised
provision into directly-funded work.59
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Ensuring quality
One main reason why some colleges reject franchising is because of concerns
about quality. The belief that franchised provision is lower quality than on-site
provision is widespread and concerns have not been allayed by evidence from
the FEFC. One sixth-form college was pulling out of its community work because
of ‘concerns about quality’. Even the large-scale franchiser acknowledged that
it has had to abandon some franchising because it found that the provider had
‘no genuine interest in the students’.
Most of the opinions regarding franchising overall were pejorative, even from
the large-scale provider. Little reference was made to the fact that such provision
might be the most suitable for NVQ provision, a large element of which involves
on-site assessment (Gravatt, 1997, p10). This omission is partly because the com-
position of much franchised work is at a low level. The NVQ argument is also
not easy to maintain if, at the same time, the college is aiming to improve par-
ticipation to non-traditional groups since employees receiving training are not
likely to be among the most excluded groups.
Another argument about quality was that those who teach franchised pro-
grammes often instigate curriculum development, yet they do not provide the
franchise college with frequent updates of this activity. As a result, continuous
improvement in the curriculum is hidden from college management. Similarly,
good quality provision is also likely to arise from knowledge of the students and
few colleges could give information about students on franchised programmes
other than that from administrative records. Little is known, for example, about
whether or not the colleges are satisfying the aspirations of these students. It
may also be difﬁcult to get learning support to students who are geographically
distant from the college or have little afﬁliation to it.
As has been seen in previous chapters, for a time, growth – much of which
was in franchised provision – was funded at the DLE price of £6·50. This ﬁgure
was substantially lower than the average level of funding at which colleges were
expected to provide. This led some professionals to conclude that franchised
provision must be receiving lower resource than core provision. However, this
argument cannot be pushed too far: franchisees may have been contributing some
of their own resource (such as the instruction site) to the training or education.
The demand-led element of funding may have been the amount of subsidy by
the FEFC; this is not the same as the total resource input. Hence the quality of
the franchised provision may be comparable to that of the core.
To ameliorate concerns over quality, some colleges developed rules about the
types of franchising they would undertake. These include franchising only to local60
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providers, only on a small-scale and only for courses which ﬁt common concep-
tions of further education. Elsewhere, franchising was undertaken by staff who,
at the least, were trained by the college.
However, such rules could be used to dress up franchising, making it appear
less opportunistic and more strategic. Given the incentives for external agencies
to seek FEFC funding for their courses, there is, as one principal put it, ‘a ready
market for units’. This ready market may help colleges that are below their
funding units target for a given year to reach such targets. However, this type
of provision may be less likely to cohere with the college mission. At present,
there is no obvious way of distinguishing these top-up franchisers from more
mission-focused franchise arrangements.
The argument that franchised provision is inferior to other provision is difﬁ-
cult to sustain across the board (DfEE, 1998a). It is not a shared view and the
large-scale providers feel justiﬁed in defending their provision on its own terms.
Several arguments were advanced in defence of franchised provision. Employers
may coerce greater commitment to learning from their participating employees.
For social or community groups and for those on sports courses, the desire to
learn may be greater. One college professional also argued that franchising has
spin-off beneﬁts, such as better links with employers and so closer job placement
links. However, there was little general support for this argument, even among
those more involved in franchising. Progression might be improved through
franchising, but given the typical provision that is franchised this is doubtful.
One college acknowledged that some franchisee institutions were averse to such
progression, preferring to keep the students as part of their own client group.
Elsewhere, geographically distant provision made progression through the
original college unlikely.
Some of the case study colleges expected franchising to be a short-lived cash
cow and regret not having seized the opportunity more. These colleges could
then have softened staff cuts resulting from general ﬁnancial pressures over the
medium term.
The problem may be more a case of whether or not the colleges and the FEFC
can actually measure quality in franchised settings, rather than being about quality
per se (Wymer, 1996). This has been one of the constraints on the growth of
franchising at particular colleges: college staff do not have the competencies to
assess quality in a franchised activity. For the FEFC, inspection of the franchised
provision may also be difﬁcult. One principal did concede that quality control
of franchised provision was ‘notional’ at the early stages of franchising; colleges
were not able to control quality.
The evidence from the case studies also reveals a number of context-related
issues that may affect quality:61
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  Franchising is ‘terribly volatile’, a ﬁnding noted not only by large-scale
franchisers. Both the number of franchisees with which the college must
deal and the units that it could accrue were volatile. For one department 
at a college, the number of units had halved between one academic year
and the next; at another, franchisees were often changing, with the
resultant income ﬂuctuating from 2% to 8% of the total. Although 
growth of franchising has been curtailed in terms of units available, 
one principal was certain and many others were conﬁdent that 
growth could still be signiﬁcant.
  Beneﬁts from franchising have failed to materialise. The extent to which
small-scale franchising is lucrative is moot: there are signiﬁcant economies
of scale in franchising (not least because of the high initial contracting
costs) and two colleges thought that provision below 50000 units was 
not likely to be proﬁtable. The college that had developed a large-scale
programme of work-based learning argued that quality franchising
required a resource commitment that was as great as that given to on-site
provision. (This was a college that had already been commended in its
FEFC inspection report for its extensive and varied links with employers
and its established and carefully managed work experience programmes.)
At other colleges, those professionals who had directly managed franchising
had argued that it was ‘not cheap’. For one department head, franchising
with another college across a range of subjects was not lucrative; 
very little of the surplus accrued to his department.
  The opportunity to deploy funds as ﬁxed capital or circulating capital
depends on whether or not the increase in funding is temporary 
or permanent. It may not be possible to deploy such funding in 
a way that does not bring a string of liabilities in the longer term.
In summary, there is anecdotal evidence that franchising may be used for cross-
subsidy by some of the large-scale providers to an extent which may not be insig-
niﬁcant. Nevertheless, for many colleges, the amount of franchised provision is
marginal and the proﬁt earned on such provision is also likely to be small.
Given the small scale of franchising undertaken at many colleges, it was unlikely
that sufﬁciently substantive cross subsidy could occur. For these small-scale
franchisers, which make up more than 80% of the sector, franchising cannot sub-
sidise core provision to any signiﬁcant degree. Not only is the provision marginal,
there are signiﬁcant constraints on its growth. Their involvement with fran-
chising may be explained by, or more cynically dressed up as, mission and the
perceived virtues of using franchising to ease the ﬁnancial squeeze on colleges
without deﬂecting from the core business.62
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There is therefore a lack of evidence that colleges have pursued franchised pro-
vision to subsidise their core provision. It has also been possible to identify several
constraints on franchising and some adverse contextual factors.
Franchising and fragmentation
So far, it has been assumed that the notion of a core of provision is not contentious.
However, this is not the case. It is not easy to maintain a deﬁnition of core pro-
vision. This is primarily because one effect of franchising has been to fragment
the sector: no common, sector mission exists against which a core and periphery
can be counterpoised.
The sector has been divided into those colleges that franchise and those that
do not. The position of the 20 or so colleges that undertake large-scale franchising
is evidently different from the rest of the sector. This is per-college fragmentation.
Franchising has also indicated a schism in the perceptions of the FEFC and those
of the colleges about the mission of the FE sector. 
Franchising, with its particular weighting towards Level 1 provision, may
accentuate the differences between sixth-form colleges and other FE providers,
with the former continuing their core purpose as to deliver A-levels. Because
franchising is a partly optional activity which is led from the top, the stance taken
by senior management may have implications for college ethos. Many colleges
orientate their provision to serving the local community; either large-scale 
franchise provision or top-up franchise provision may be discordant with that
mission.
One of the concerns over franchising is the lack of control over staff involved
in franchising and their separation from the college. One curriculum manager
acknowledged that the ‘college did not [even] like using agency staff’. Some
lecturing staff regarded franchising as ‘expedient’ or ‘opportunistic’ (this is a
view we found at colleges in Wales). Franchising activities may be recasting the
college staff as course validators. When pressed directly on this, college staff said
that this would ‘negate the role of the college’. For franchising to be worthwhile
the college would have to ‘add value’; this exact phrase was used by two of the
principals who engaged in small-scale franchising. Fragmentation has occurred
between staff and college management.
The competitive advantage claimed for franchising does not seem to have
been a signiﬁcant factor. One college did consider that its motivation for fran-
chising was lessened by the behaviour and the relative expertise of other colleges
in the area. For the sixth-form colleges, which are minimally involved in franchise
provision, competition is against each other and against schools. For colleges
interested in strengthening their position against schools, franchising is unlikely
to have attractions beyond being a source of revenue. Given that the growth of63
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franchising has bypassed GCE A-level provision, the income that it generates is
unlikely to reduce the inequity in funding compared to schools, one of the clearest
complaints from principals (Graham, 1997, p556). Franchising seems unlikely,on
this evidence, to ﬁgure in a college’s competitive strategy.
Franchising may have exacerbated other resource tensions. As one of the prin-
cipals observed, franchisers are more likely to approach some types of college
than others – sixth-form colleges, with the greatest similarity to schools, were
thought less likely to be approached. Hence franchising represents another source
of income which, like other marginal sources of income (European Social Fund,
widening participation funds), varies according to college type. In comparison
with these other income streams, franchising may also have been a more ready
source of funding. Bourn (1997, p2) ﬁnds that ‘colleges have not succeeded in
increasing their levels of funds from private sources’: enrolment between
1994/95 and 1995/96 fell by 9% for students funded by other agencies.
What some colleges now regard as the missed opportunity of franchising also
reﬂects on how colleges have interpreted not just their own missions but also
the position of the FEFC. This results from diverse interpretations of the FEFC’s
policy drivers. Some principals were not certain why the FEFC would wish 
to support franchising; without FEFC guidance, some colleges were uncertain
about how to grow and what would happen if they did not grow. Indirectly, the
Education and Employment Committee recognises this issue in asserting that
further education:
has now reached the stage where the Government now has to make 
choices and explain its priorities. The key point is that criteria for the
allocation of public money to further education should be made clear.
DfEE, 1998c, pix
From the evidence of college professionals, there was disagreement over whether
the FEFC encouraged franchising or not. Others thought that the FEFC was
ambivalent about what should be bought with FEFC money (FEFC, 1996, p3),
beyond making clear its willingness to pay for elements of provision. However,
this view was not generally shared. One professional argued that the FEFC should
have a role in encouraging people to do the qualiﬁcations that the Government
thinks they should take.
However, precisely what the FEFC should buy is a more contentious issue.
Even classifying FE provision into three broad types – academic, vocational and
community work – there was no ready presumption about which was most
legitimate or what should be proscribed. Given the entrepreneurial and responsive
face of further education (‘operating at the interstices of economic change’, 
as one principal put it), it seems unlikely that there could be such a consensus.64
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It is difﬁcult to present the sector as responsive while also deﬁning beforehand
what the sector should or should not provide. Although there was no ready con-
sensus over what should be done, there was more clarity about the undesirability
of funding ‘dead weight’. The general feeling was that there had been some subsidy
in the provision to business, perhaps for training they would have undertaken
anyway. Such franchising took money away from the core mission of colleges,
resulting in even greater divergence of funding against other providers.
Conclusions
Franchising has risks, ﬁnancially and educationally, and these risks are likely to
check the growth of such provision for some colleges. Franchising, even for the
small-scale providers, is volatile both in terms of scale and in terms of quality.
Franchising has revealed, if not a ‘lack of vision informing clear strategic prior-
ities’ (FEFC, 1997c, Annex A, p5) by colleges, at least a divergence in views about
what should legitimately be funded as further education. Concomitant with this,
franchising has further fragmented the sector. This has happened because the
opportunities for franchising were not spread evenly in the ﬁrst instance and
because franchising has been cumulative, with large-scale franchisers growing
larger. Franchising is used as a vehicle for increasing participation or improving
access; small-scale franchisers welcomed this opportunity. Yet this form of fran-
chising is not particularly favoured in the funding method: funding for a fran-
chise is independent of the amount of effort secured in obtaining it. To some
extent, this will bias franchising towards top-up purchasers and away from
colleges overtly seeking to franchise in such a way as to provide a ﬁrst step of
access to education for marginal groups.
There is also concern over a funding method that stimulates short-term oppor-
tunities to obtain extra funding. Colleges are pressured into franchising by com-
petition. There are not only legitimate concerns about how to ensure good quality
of provision but also uncertainties over the extent to which such activity will be
funded. In Wales, where franchising has been much less pervasive, the cap on
funding has made direct the link between greater money for franchising and less
money for mainstream or core provision.
During the more expansive franchising period of 1995/97, where the revenues
from franchising were as uncertain as the costs, franchising may have had a65
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destabilising effect. The funding method may in future have to change dependent
on how the colleges behave. If a large number of colleges franchise, the funding
method will have to accommodate this new scenario and will do so in a way that
may disadvantage the colleges that do not franchise. One principal was explicit
that the college policy on franchising had largely been decided by second-
guessing the FEFC’s response.
Franchised provision must be subject to the same quality requirements as 
on-site provision. The FEFC Chief Inspector’s report for 1995/96 observes that
franchising is likely to run into difﬁculties either when: undertaken hastily; atypical
of the core provision of a college; the franchise work is at a distance from the
college; the provision is large-scale (1997b). At present, all of these options remain
open. In Wales, there has been persuasion against franchising and colleges are
only allowed to charge a 10% mark-up on any franchised provision. The returns
from franchising are therefore lower in Wales.
Beyond this, any other responses may be more debatable, as they will reﬂect
judgements about the relative merits of different programmes. Cuts in funding
to franchised provision or capping the amount of franchising (as proposed to
the Education and Employment Committee [DfEE, 1998c, pxl]) may be difﬁcult
to enforce since colleges can often circumvent the rules. This will actually reduce
the less proﬁtable forms of franchising, despite the concerns being mainly over
the most proﬁtable forms (Styles, 1998, p2). Other options, which face the same
criticisms, include only funding franchising: after a lag when it conforms to the
college’s own cohort; when it is within the local region; at a diminishing rate per
size of franchise. Another option, narrowing the curriculum (also suggested to
the Education and Employment Committee [DfEE, 1998c, pxlii]), would have
the beneﬁt of clarifying what the FEFC regards as publicly fundable, as well as
restricting some forms of franchising.
Much of the sector appreciates and welcomes the opening up of new markets
in further education; these are a reﬂection of the creativity and dynamism within
the sector. New forms of provision should not be automatically regarded as pro-
blems for the sector to solve. Yet, as the experiences with franchising indicate,
detailed priorinvestigation is needed as to how such market needs are to be met.
Otherwise, the responses of colleges to changes in student needs, funding for-
mulae and regional circumstances will repeatedly surprise the sector.66
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6.The selling 
of FE Lite
How we spent a bundle 
of cash without increasing 
opportunities at all
Adrian Perry
Introduction
In early 1997, the FEFC was conducting what was laughably called a ‘fundamental
review’ of the unit-based funding system it had adopted in 1993/94. There was
little enthusiasm for this review for several reasons. One was that it was obviously
a put-up job: no change was likely to be made to the funding system that so
entranced principals and policy makers. We were important people because we
understood the system and others didn’t. Another was more mundane. Those
working in further education had come to see that the quantum of money coming
into the sector – something that was beyond their control – mattered at least as
much as the way it was channelled to institutions. This was, let’s remember, the
midst of the crisis caused by the withdrawal of the demand-led element (DLE).
But there was also a feeling that, despite the pain, the sector had created some-
thing admirable – a system that rewarded growth, and efﬁciency, and quality. 
It was even said that schools and TECs should transfer to this system, that New
Deal should be funded this way. Like people following the truth of a weird sect
leader, colleges not only believed unquestioningly in the rightness of their cause:
they even argued that others should join. I found this bizarre at the time. There
was little evidence that the funding system had improved results or raised overall
growth, and I argued so in a paper for a FEDA seminar.67
For better or worse
My paper had no effect on the shape of the funding system. It conﬁrmed my desire
to establish a support organisation – The Cassandra Trust? – to counsel those who
give unheeded warnings. But the paper also entered the debate on franchising,
which was then raging. On the one side were colleges who were outraged that
public funds were being plundered to little apparent beneﬁt. On the other were
those who had invested heavily in franchising, who argued that they were bringing
education and training to new groups (not just commercially astute but also
morally sound).
It’s an emotive debate, and it may pay to start with some ground clearing.
First of all, few colleges did anything against the rules as set out to them. These
allowed – in fact encouraged – you to enrol students through third parties and
at some distance. Franchising provided a way for colleges to avoid cuts, expand
staff, not worry about missing targets, please governors and pose as thrusting
entrepreneurs. It also reduced the apparent unit cost (average level of funding or
ALF) at a time when that was all that mattered in further education. The fact
that some colleges went into excess was inevitable. The FEFC cannot take a high
moral tone. It was warned what was happening, and ignored the warnings. It
really will not do to criticise the greed of children left alone in the sweet shop.
Indeed, the easy growthbought in by the mega-franchisers allowed the FEFC to
hit their student targets at a time when that was important. To take an example,
almost the whole of the growth in part-time numbers between 1994/95 and
1995/96 was caused by franchising. The complicity was helpful.
Second, the franchise debate seems to me to ask important questions, not just
about the scope of further education (what can we do to repair the ﬁssure that
has grown between us and the employed population: how can we get into the
market for training those at work) but more profoundly what do we mean by a
public service? What should people expect to be paid by Government, and what
by employer, and what by themselves? It is a debate to which we have returned
in the context of individual learning accounts.
Lastly, and like many principals, I wonder whether my hostility is because 
I should have climbed aboard the franchise gravy train much earlier.
The problem with franchising
There are six major problems with franchise work as presently constituted:
  It diverted funds and attention from mainstream work
  It sprang up undiscussed and unplanned
  The funds it used could have been better used elsewhere68
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  We paid for training that would have been going on anyway, 
or was not meant to be funded as further education
  It distorts comparisons of growth and costs
  It works against local and regional planning for educational capacity.
Diversion
I don’t think anyone can deny that mainstream further education paid for the
expansion of franchising. Funds were sucked into colleges that declared low ALF
and high growth achieved through franchising. In a system where growth funding
was allocated by reference to unit cost and past growth record (rather than social
need or catchmentsize), the effect was to deny funds to colleges who would have
been able to grow their mainstream work at standard rates. The growthin student
numbers was so great that the target level of funding for convergence – an average
established in the early days of incorporation to ensure colleges were funded
equitably – fell from ‘within 10% of £18·50’ to £16·20. Given that a full-time
student would attract, say, 130 units in a year, this cut resources by £300. In a
750000-unit college like Lambeth (not atypical) it was the cause of a £1·7m budget
loss – money that was massaged to private trainers and proﬁtable companies.
The diversion has been not just of funds but also managerial and curriculum
development attention – the analogy is with UK industry’s bad habit of expan-
ding by takeovers rather than by internal growth. ‘If one ﬁrm defects from
industrial strategy and grows by acquisition, then all ﬁrms are trapped by the
rules of the game.’ (Hutton W. The state we’re in. London: Vintage; 1996.) The
inspection reports on Halton College and Bilston College showed it was easy
for colleges keen on outward/off-site collaborative provision (OCP) to neglect the
need to provide a quality experience to their local users. For Cricklade College,
OCP appeared to be just about the only decent work in the college. Other colleges
found it easier to buy in growth elsewhere than meet local need.
Undiscussed and unplanned
Even if the Treasury hadn’t cut up rough, there were reasons to oppose franchising.
The Treasury is not a careless organisation: the funds that we had were brought
in to the sector in 1993/94 to be spent on our students. No one asked us – or, it
appears, the Government – about taking it from the majority of colleges to be pass-
ed on as ‘bunce’ for the few. There has been much self-satisﬁed talk from the FEFC
of consultative styles: but would we have assented, if consulted, to our money being
top sliced for a few colleges to go massively into the private market? The exercise
can only be justiﬁed in terms of increasing the FE market share – in which case
it should have been nationally coordinated. But it wasn’t. What happened was
that most colleges in the sector were obliged to share the pain of the cuts that69
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followed the withdrawal of the demand-led element (DLE), the driving down of
the target ALF from £18·50 to £16·20, while having very obviously had no part
in the earlier gain. In passing, how bizarre that a massively over-audited sector
let this dragon, unsupervised, out of its lair, where local education authority
(LEA) ‘sloppiness’ had prevented it for years? It stands proud, alongside BCCI,
Robert Maxwell and Nick Leeson, in the auditors’ hall of fame.
Opportunity costs
Even if we had the money and could get franchising past the Government, one
has to ask whether it was such a good idea at a time of substantial cuts. The
correct way to judge this is not to ask ‘was it useful’ but ‘was it more useful than
the other things the money could have bought?’ It has been calculated that
colleges will spend £200m in 1998/9 on franchising. Julian Gravatt points out
that this sum could:
  Give all lecturers a 5% backdated pay-rise
  Provide maintenance grants for half of further education’s adult students
  Add an hour of teaching to every course in the country
  Increase Access Funding ten-fold.
More crudely, the money could have opened 10 new colleges, or given £400000
to all existing ones.
There was a spurious justiﬁcation from the argument that the DLE funds that
supported franchising expansion were additional to the main FE budget, but this
holds no water. Remember, the system enabled colleges to consolidate all their
units achieved one year into their main allocation in the following year. What
was extra money in year one gave access to core money in year two, money that
could only come from the more restrained mass of colleges. From my end, I had
to close a dyslexia project in Brixton so that the sector could maintain subsidies
to some of Britain’s most proﬁtable private businesses.
Replacement and additionality
The National Audit Ofﬁce investigation that was ﬁnally called told us what we
already knew – that ‘there is no robust mechanism for verifying that funding is
only provided for training that is additional to existing provision’. I am not talking
about fraud (although it appears that this has happened), but about pre-existing
work that is now funded from the FE sector’s budget. Much of this work plainly
was diversionary – the St John Ambulance Brigade and sub-aqua clubs existed
and trained before further education became their godfathers.
Other programmes in private and community trainers were formerly TEC
ﬁnanced, and our willingness to take them onto our budget has moderated the70
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effect of cuts there. This is delightfully quixotic, but impoverishes our own work
and subverts Government public expenditure planning. There is also an avalanche
of anecdotal information that further education is paying for leisure classes: 
I tired of being told by amused friends that, after their weekend sports or ﬁrst aid
or painting course, they have become ofﬁcially students of this or that college
miles away. In the context of capped growth these arrangements simply displace
provision: the national quantum of training actually falls.
The argument about franchise to employers is more complex. For many years
FE colleges subsidised employer training in the form of apprentice day-release –
indeed, in many parts of the country, this was their origin. However, the view
that franchising has enabled us to bring training to large successful industrial
companies seems to the outsider weak. Take the subsidies to Tesco and Boots
entered into by FE colleges: is it really possible to gain Investors in People (IiP)
status, or overtake Sainsbury’s, without adequate staff development? This is not
to decry work with employers – but perhaps we should return to the idea that
they should pay for this work at full cost. Franchising has worked to prevent the
FEFC achieving one of its Government targets: to diversify the funding of the
sector. At one level, why should a college pursue commercial income when FEFC
stood ready to fund apparently limitless expansion from the budgets of those
stick-in-the-mud colleges who chose to stay working for local people? On the
other, what ﬁrm will pay full cost when a generous subsidy is available down
the road? A leading Midlands college reports that the income of its commercial
unit has fallen by two-thirds since incorporation because of contracts being
taken away by collegesoffering franchise deals. Another Merseyside college tells
the poignant tale of losing a commercial contract with News International to
Halton College’s franchise machine. Rupert Murdoch used to pay the FE sector
for training; now we pay him. Perhaps Wapping has a disadvantaged postcode.
Comparisons of growth and costs
Franchising has also distorted comparisons of growth and costs. Because it just
happened (and some jumped on before the others twigged) a small number of
colleges beneﬁted mightily. This completely subverted subsequent judgements
about expansion and costs – how much easier to reduce ALF by supporting sports-
club training than (to take a painful local example) losing 200 staff and seven
sites. This mattered crucially – college budgets were allocated according to growth
and apparent unit cost, and almost nothing else. The advice was taken far too late:
‘The simplest way to secure a low ALF is through franchising; there is a strong
case for disentangling non-franchised and franchised provision before using the
ALF for funding allocations or other statistics’. By the time the FEFC, under71
For better or worse
Government pressure, had erected procedural bars on the window, the burglar
was inside the house with the Yale on his key-ring. How is this trick achieved?
Compare for a moment various colleges’ position in the 1993 league table of
costs per student (Circular 93/09) with their 1996 position in cost per unit. Let’s
take Knowsley College – a low ALF college that does hardly any franchise work
and has never missed its target – as our stable gold standard. One high-
franchising London college was 69% more costly than Knowsley in 1992/93, but
11% cheaper just three years later. The proﬁts that were made on franchising –
typically buying in work at £6·00–9·00 that was being billed to the FEFC at
£15·00–17·00 – meant that the normal work of the college was actually much
more expensive than the competition, not less !
The distortion applied at the planning end. It was very difﬁcult to make regional
assessments of adequacy and sufﬁciency of training if students were being regis-
tered across the country. The FEFC must have found it difﬁcult to identify col-
leges in local decline if they were able to hide the fact that they were buying in (as
happened in one case) up to one-third of their workload from Islamic groups
off site. And the ease with which units could be bought allowed Government and
FEFC to funk the fact that the growth targets established for further education
could only be achieved by a well-funded and sustained programme of educa-
tional expansion.
What was the FEFC’s attitude?
FEFC’s response was clouded. On the one hand, they issued ever more restrictive
circulars on collaboration. On the other, they told us that they were an FE funding
council, not a colleges funding council – along the lines that local government
is now an agency, not a provider. We are asked why our current students should
be considered more deserving than those getting franchise. It seems that there
are now two brands of further education – FE Classic, in colleges, and FE Lite,
out in private trainers and employers. This ignores the points made above, and
the importance of stable suppliers and organic community links to genuine skill
development. Finally, and, one suspects, after heavy DfEE and Treasury arm-
twisting, they stepped in to make regulations that restricted the practice. Fran-
chising was useful, it transpired, but only in support of local community devel- 
opment or in support of specialist industrial training. The rest had to go.
It was just in time. If franchise had been allowed to go on, it would have des-
troyed further education as we knew it. There is hardly a college in the country
that wouldn’t make very large surpluses by closing its main programme and
buying in collaborative work from ﬁrms and private trainers. We would all be
obliged to enter the game: anyone not doing so would appear slow growing and72
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high ALF, and thus would be crushed by the allocation criteria. The average level
of funding would fall each year, as we all tried to run to stay in the same place.
There would be a forced mission change for community-based further education.
But it wouldn’t end there: with every college a mini-TEC. Any intelligent Gov-
ernment would cut out the middle man, rather than let colleges take the proﬁts:
why fund a college at £15 a unit for it to be farmed out to the real provider at
£9? The FE sector – where I qualiﬁed, and my daughters and friends, created by
earnest Victorian mechanics and philanthropic industrialists, nurtured by local
and national pride – would have disappeared.73
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7 .Update
A summaryof the changes
introduced in1999
Mick Fletcher
T
he development of franchising in the mid 1990s led to a great deal of
interest from both the FE sector and those concerned with its regulation.
The subject of a National Survey by the FEFC Inspectorate, franchising
was also under scrutiny from the Education and Employment Select
Committee, the National Audit Ofﬁce and the Public Accounts Committee. By
the end of 1998, when this report was commissioned, the FEFC itself had issued
information and guidance related to franchising in some 32 different circulars
and 16 separate issues of Council news.
However, there was more to come. The various national enquiries and perhaps
the investigations into college mismanagement at Halton and Bilston suggested
that further and ﬁrmer regulation of college franchising was needed. Accordingly
in 1999 the FEFC consulted on and then implemented more extended guidance
and regulations. The guidance was intended to ﬁnally put a stop to those aspects
of franchising that alarmed its critics but retain the valuable elements that many
have identiﬁed. Only time will tell whether it has been successful. Earlier chapters
in this book have outlined the debate about franchising – its strengths and weak-
nesses. The aim of this concluding chapter is brieﬂy to summarise the controls
introduced.
By the middle of 1999 the FEFC had produced seven further circulars rel-
evant to the franchising debate; two were wholly devoted to the topic. The ﬁrst,
Circular 99/06, set out proposals for consultation. The second, Circular 99/37,74
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conﬁrmed decisions taken in the light of feedback. The sector largely supported
the proposals. In addition to outlining current policy Circular 99/37 included a
revised model contract for colleges to use and, usefully for researchers, a full
summary of all FEFC documents relating to the topic.
The introduction to Circular 99/06, Franchising, fees and related matters,
ﬁnally clariﬁes terminology. The term to be used when colleges deliver further
education through external partners is franchising. For a time the term outward
collaborative provision had been used in preference. From 1998 however, collabo-
ration became a much more important policy objective, and began to be applied
to partnerships delivering services that went beyond further education. As a
result, the term franchising returned to favour. The key feature is that franchising
is one mode of delivering further education distinguished from direct provision
where the staff involved work under the direct management of the college.
An important element in the tighter regulation of franchising has been the
clearer deﬁnition of the difference between direct and franchised provision. In
part the FEFC was concerned to underline the status quo, but it also had an 
eye on possible strategies imaginative institutions might deploy for circum-
venting the regulations. The main difference between franchised and direct pro-
vision relates to who has direct managerial control of the staff. Who employs
the staff is an insufﬁcient test because of the increasing volume of direct pro-
vision delivered by colleges using agency staff. The regulations are also carefully
worded to ensure that secondment cannot be used as a device to escape restric-
tions on franchising.
Armed with a clear deﬁnition of franchising the FEFC sets out in the circulars
a series of explicit restrictions on colleges. The restrictions principally relate to
funding, out of area provision and quality control.
Funding arrangements
The changes in funding arrangements respond to the concerns raised in earlier
chapters by Brian Styles and Adrian Perry; that franchising grew because it was
overpriced in the tariff. Supporting evidence is in the form of a cost study carried
out for the FEFC by KPMG which showed that on average franchised provision
cost around 37% less to deliver than direct provision. The study was reported
in Council news50. From 1999/2000 the funding units associated with franchised
provision are, with limited exceptions, to be multiplied by a discounting factor
of 0·67. The aim is to make franchising a less lucrative proposition and minimise
the potential distorting effect on resource allocation.
The exceptions are designed to cover those cases where franchising genuinely
serves to widen participation and where it is provided by community-based,
normally non-proﬁt bodies. Community-based provision will not normally cover
employed students or provision which is work related.75
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The potential problems associated with employer-based franchising are addressed
in other ways. One recurring concern has been the need to avoid ‘dead weight’:
public funding simply paying for training which employers would have pro-
vided anyway. The recent circulars emphasise the distinction between employer-
led activity and dedicated employer provision. Dedicated employment provision,
which covers programmes designed speciﬁcally to meet the needs of individual
employers, attracts a lower level of support from public funds. Delivered through
franchising it is therefore subject to a double discount and the relevant funding
units are multiplied by 0·45.
The ﬁnal funding issue addressed in Circular 99/37 is the concern that some
colleges have not charged fees to students attending franchised provision and
have used this practice to undercut other colleges. If unchecked this could under-
mine the intention of the Secretary of State for Education and Employment to
increase the contribution from employers to the cost of further education. The
settlement for 1999/2000 assumes that colleges will raise an extra £35 million
from employers and that this will increase to an extra £60 million in 2000/2001.
The approach adopted by the FEFC for 1999/2000 has been to make a clear
recommendation to colleges as to what fees to charge. Recommended fees are
set out in the circular, based on the long-standing assumption that tuition fees
cover approximately 25% of the costs of a programme. There are clear hints,
however, that if this recommendation fails there could be regulation in respect
of fees.
Out of area provision
The second major area of new regulation concerns the provision of franchised
programmes outside a college’s local area. Many colleges had complained that
they were facing wasteful competition from other colleges in their local com-
munities and in many cases were simply unaware of which colleges were making
provision in an area. Franchising forms only part of a developing policy that
seeks to direct colleges towards meeting the needs of their local catchment area.
Draft guidance on the local priorities policy is set out in full in a separate
consultation circular, Local priorities (99/39).
The speciﬁc impact on franchising is that colleges should not enter new con-
tracts for franchising outside their local area and should not plan for increased
numbers outside their local area from existing franchises. Colleges should only
plan to meet needs outside their area when it is clear that needs inside that area
have been met. Local learning partnerships will review provision in an area and
determine what provision is needed.
While the principle is clear there may be some residual difﬁculties with the
implementation of this policy. A number of the large-scale franchisers have devel-
oped close links with national organisations which may not want to establish76
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separate contracts with several institutions. Also a number of colleges have
developed national specialisms. It would be uneconomical to replicate these on
a large-scale. There may be further evolution of this policy.
The new regulatory arrangements bring a welcome transparency to FE pro-
vision. A common complaint of college principals was that they did not know
who was offering courses in their area. Colleges are now expected to consult
with local learning partnerships, and the FEFC has published information on
who provides what and where. This principle of transparency is underlined by
the requirement of franchising partners to disclose all current and past con-
tracting arrangements with the FE sector. The FEFC publishes a list of franchise
partner organisations that have links with more than one college. The list is
available on the FEFC’s website at www.fefc.ac.uk 
Quality control
The ﬁnal set of changes to the regulation relates to management and quality
assurance. Since franchise arrangements can pose difﬁcult issues for management
and the maintenance of quality, the FEFC has decided that no new franchising
activity can be started by a college that has received an inspection grade four
or ﬁve for governance, management or quality assurance. A grade four or ﬁve
means that the observed weaknesses in that area outweighed the strengths of
provision. The restriction on new activity also covers replacements for existing
franchises.77
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The basic requirement for franchising to be lawful – that the college is fully in
control of the arrangements – is unchanged from that set out three years earlier
(see Circular 96/06). The FEFC notes however, that while in some cases a college
might have had the formal arrangements in place its management of the rela-
tionship was not sufﬁciently formal in practice. It therefore sets out in detail the
responsibility of governors to receive regular reports, and to have in place a
sound system of internal audit and control.
The outcome of the extensive enquiries into franchising at a national level
has resulted in it being heavily constrained but not prescribed. Franchising is,
as Jan Dominey argues in her paper, a valid mode of delivery with particular
strengths in meeting certain types of need. In particular community-based fran-
chising is seen as having a useful continuing role. However, the tighter regu-
lation also accepts that the operation of the tariff in the mid 1990s, enhanced
by the convergence agenda and the pressure for growth, introduced a serious
distortion in the planning of FE provision. To that extent the arguments of Brian
Styles and Adrian Perry are well made and the refocusing of the FE mission
appropriate. 
There are also wider lessons about the advantages and limitations of the
competitive market-driven approach applied in further education. The Learning
and Skills Council proposed in the White Paper Learning to succeedshould take
careful note of the franchising episode when working out the difﬁcult balance
between responsibility and responsiveness for the new sector.78
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Acronyms
AoC Association of Colleges
ALF average level of funding
ALS additional learning support
CLAIT Computer Literacy and Information Technology
CP collaborative provision
DfEE Department for Education and Employment
DLE demand-led element
ELS Education Lecturing Services
EU European Union
FEFC Further Education Funding Council
FTE full-time equivalent
FU funding unit
IiP Investors in People
ISR individualised student record
LEA local education authority
NHS National Health Service
NTET National Target for Education and Training
NVQ national vocational qualiﬁcation
OCP outward/off-site collaborative provision
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PFI Private Finance Initiative
SITO Security Industry Training Organisation
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
TAC Tariff Advisory Committee
TEC training and enterprise council
UfI University for Industry